Optimal Unilateral Carbon Policy by Kortum, Samuel & Weisbach, David A.
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers Cowles Foundation 
11-8-2021 
Optimal Unilateral Carbon Policy 
Samuel Kortum 
Yale University 
David A. Weisbach 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kortum, Samuel and Weisbach, David A., "Optimal Unilateral Carbon Policy" (2021). Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Papers. 2659. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2659 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at 
Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
  
OPTIMAL UNILATERAL CARBON POLICY 
By 
Samuel Kortum and David A. Weisbach 
November 2021 
COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2311 
COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS 
YALE UNIVERSITY 
Box 208281 
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281 
http://cowles.yale.edu/ 
Optimal Unilateral Carbon Policy∗
Samuel Kortum† and David A. Weisbach‡
November 6, 2021
Abstract
We derive the optimal unilateral policy in a general equilibrium model
of trade and climate change where one region of the world imposes a
climate policy and the rest of the world does not. A climate policy in one
region shifts activities—extraction, production, and consumption—in the
other region. The optimal policy trades off the costs of these distortions.
The optimal policy can be implemented through: (i) a nominal tax on
extraction at a rate equal to the global marginal harm from emissions, (ii)
a tax on imports of energy and goods, and a rebate of taxes on exports of
energy but not goods, both at a lower rate than the extraction tax rate,
and (iii) a goods-specific export subsidy. The policy controls leakage
by combining supply-side and demand-side taxes to control the price of
energy in the non-taxing region. It exploits international trade to expand
the reach of the climate policy. We calibrate and simulate the model to
illustrate how the optimal policy compares to more traditional policies
such as extraction, production, and consumption taxes and combinations
of those taxes. The simulations show that combinations of supply-side
and demand-side taxes are much better than simpler policies and can
perform nearly as well as the optimal policy.
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1 Introduction
Global negotiations have given up trying to achieve a uniform approach to climate
change, such as a harmonized global carbon tax. Instead, current negotiations
focus on achieving uniform participation, with each country pursuing its own
approach and its own level of emissions reductions. As a result, policies to control
emissions of greenhouse gases vary widely by country, and are likely to continue
to do so for the indefinite future.
Widely varying carbon policies potentially affect the location of extraction,
production, and consumption, the effectiveness of the policies, and the welfare
of people in various countries or regions. These effects are of critical importance
to the design of carbon policy and to its political feasibility. For example, trade
and location effects were central to the design of the European Union Emissions
Trading System, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and California’s carbon
pricing system. The EU is considering adding a Carbon Border Adjustment
Mechanism to address trade problems. One of the reasons that the United States
did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol was concern about the lack of emissions policies
in developing countries and the resulting trade effects. Unless concerns about the
effects of differential carbon prices are addressed, it may be difficult to achieve
significant reductions in global emissions.
To address this problem, we develop an analytic general equilibrium model
of international trade, where one region (Home) imposes a carbon policy and
the rest of the world (Foreign) does not. The model stacks Markusen (1975)
and Dornbusch, Fisher, and Samuelson (1977; henceforth DFS). We interpret
Markusen as a model of extraction and trade in fossil fuels, with DFS bringing in
production, trade, and consumption of goods produced with fossil fuels. Following
Böhringer, Lange, and Rutherford (2014), we restrict policies adopted by Home
to those that do not make Foreign worse off. Our solution strategy borrows from
Costinot, Donaldson, Vogel, and Werning (2015; henceforth CDVW).
A planner seeking to optimize Home’s welfare balances three wedges: (i) the
wedge between the planner’s marginal valuation of extracting a unit of energy
and the Foreign energy price (the extraction wedge); (ii) the wedge between the
planner’s marginal valuation of energy when used and the Foreign energy price
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(the consumption wedge); and (iii) the wedge between the shadow cost of Home’s
exports of goods to Foreign and marginal utility to consumers in Foreign of those
goods (the export wedge).
Each of these wedges corresponds to an activity in Foreign that is not directly
under the planner’s control. The extraction wedge reflects changes in Foreign
extraction due to changes in the price of energy, an effect we think of as extraction
leakage. The consumption wedge reflects the changes in energy embodied in goods
produced and consumed in Foreign. The export wedge reflects changes in Home’s
exports of goods. Together, the consumption wedge and the export wedge capture
conventional leakage. The planner sets the optimal policy to balance the marginal
costs of these different channels of leakage.
The taxes and subsidies that generate this policy in a decentralized equilibrium
match up with these wedges: a tax on domestic extraction equal to the extraction
wedge, a tax on all domestic production and domestic consumption equal to the
consumption wedge, and an export subsidy equal to the export wedge. These
taxes and subsidies can be implemented via nominal taxes and border adjustments
as follows: (i) a domestic carbon tax on the extraction of fossil fuels at the global
marginal harm from emissions, i.e., at the full Pigouvian rate; (ii) a border tax
on imports and a tax rebate for exports of fossil fuels, both at a rate equal to the
consumption wedge (which we will call a “partial border adjustment” because it is
at a lower rate than the underlying nominal extraction tax); (iii) a border tax
on the energy content of imports at that same partial rate; and (iv) an export
subsidy designed to expand low-carbon exports from Home to the rest of the
world, set at the export wedge. While the nominal extraction tax is equal to the
Pigouvian rate, the partial border adjustment removes some of that tax, leaving
the effective extraction tax equal to (minus) the extraction wedge.
To compare the optimal policy to more conventional policies, such as a basic
extraction tax, a basic production tax, a basic consumption tax, and combinations
of these taxes, we solve the model when the planner is constrained in the outcomes
it can control. The planner’s solution in each case follows the same logic as the
optimal policy, setting the policy wedges to balance the marginal costs of different
channels of leakage. Policies that combine taxes on both the supply and demand
for energy inherit some of the good properties of the unilaterally optimal policy.
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To explore the quantitative implications of our analysis, we calibrate the model
and solve it numerically for both the optimal policy and the various constrained
policies. In our core calibration, we assume that the OECD countries impose
a carbon price and the rest of the world does not. Following the intuition just
described, policies that combine taxes on the supply and demand for fossil fuels
perform well in our simulations, considerably outperforming the more standard
demand-side taxes on emissions from domestic production and those taxes com-
bined with border adjustments, even approaching the outcomes of the optimal
policy. As a result, these combinations of basic taxes may be desirable approaches
for implementing a unilateral carbon policy. The combination of an extraction
tax and a production tax would, in addition, be much easier to implement than
several more conventional approaches.1
Our core model does not include renewable energy, and stimulating renewables
is often seen as a central goal of carbon pricing. To examine this issue, we extend
the analysis to show that including renewables only requires modest adjustments
to the optimal policy. Not surprisingly, renewables are exempt from the tax on
extraction, which therefore acts as an implicit subsidy.
The paper proceeds as follows. The remainder of this section provides ad-
ditional motivation and reviews the relevant literature. Section 2 lays out the
basic elements of the model. Section 3 solves the problem of a planner designing
an optimal carbon policy for one region with the other region behaving as in
the competitive equilibrium. In Section 4 we derive a set of taxes and subsidies
that implement the optimal policy. Section 5 derives the taxes that Home would
impose if it is constrained to using simpler policies. We explore the quantitative
implications of the optimal policy in Section 6, using a calibrated version of
the model. Section 7 extends the analysis to include a renewable energy sector.
1This tax can be imposed with a nominal tax on extraction combined with border adjustments
(at a lower rate) on the imports and exports of energy, but not goods. As suggested by Metcalf
and Weisbach (2009), an extraction tax would be easy to impose because there are a relatively
small number of large extractors who would need to remit taxes. Border adjustments on energy
would also be easy to impose because imports and exports of energy are already carefully tracked.
As a result, the simulations suggest that the combination of an extraction tax and a production
tax is a promising policy to explore. It is also likely that the extraction/production hybrid
raises fewer concerns about WTO compatibility than do the optimal tax or conventional border




Because of its prominence, there is a voluminous prior literature studying this
problem. The overwhelming majority of studies use computable general equilib-
rium models to simulate carbon taxes and border adjustments. By our count,
there are over 50 CGE studies of the general problem of differential carbon prices
in the peer-reviewed literature (and many more in the gray literature). Branger
and Quirion (2014) perform a meta-analysis of 25 studies of differential carbon
taxes (20 of which were CGE studies while 5 were partial equilibrium studies).
These 25 studies had 310 different modeled scenarios.
CGE studies almost uniformly use leakage as their measure of the effects
of differential carbon prices. Leakage is commonly defined as the increase in
emissions in non-taxing regions as a percentage of the reduction in emissions in
the taxing region (Hence, 100% leakage means the policy is totally ineffective in
reducing global emissions). Leakage estimates fall within a relatively consistent
range. Branger and Quirion’s meta-study finds leakage rates between 5% and
25% with a mean of 14% without border adjustments. With border adjustments,
leakage ranges from −5% to 15%, with a mean of 6%. Similarly, as summarized by
Böhringer et al. (2012), the Energy Modeling Forum commissioned 12 modeling
groups to study the effects of border adjustments on leakage using a common data
set and common set of scenarios. They considered emissions prices in the Kyoto
Protocol Annex B countries (roughly the OECD) that reduce global emissions by
about 9.5%. Without border adjustments, leakage rates were in the range of 5%
to 19% with a mean value of 12%. These studies find that border adjustments
reduce leakage by about a third, with a range between 2% and 12% and a mean
value of 8%. Elliott et al. (2013) replicated 19 prior studies within their own
CGE model, finding leakage rates between 15% and 30% for a tax on Annex B
countries that reduced global emissions by about 13%.2
2Other surveys of the leakage literature include Droge et al. (2009), Zhang (2012) and Metz
et al. (2007). A few studies focus on the effects of carbon taxes on particular energy-intensive
and trade-exposed sectors. For example, Fowlie et al. (2016) consider the effects of a carbon
price on the Portland cement industry. They find that a carbon price has the potential to
4
Rather than a large CGE model, we use an analytic general equilibrium model
of trade to study the problem. This approach allows us to uncover the underlying
economic logic for why some policies perform better than others, as well as solve
for the optimal policy. It means, however, that our quantitative analysis is more
illustrative than definitive.
There are a number of studies that precede us in this approach. The classic
study, which we build on, is Markusen (1975). Markusen analyzes a two-country,
two-good model in which production of one of the goods generates pollution
that harms both countries. Writing before climate change was a widespread
concern, he considers a simple pollutant, such as the release of chemicals into
Lake Erie by polluters in the United States, which harms Canada (as well as the
United States). One of the countries imposes policies to address the pollution;
the other is passive. Markusen finds that the optimal tax is a Pigouvian tax on
the dirty good combined with a tariff (if the good is imported) or a subsidy (if it
is exported). The optimal tariff or subsidy combines terms of trade considerations
and considerations related to leakage and is generally lower than the Pigouvian
tax.3 Other analytic models of the problem include Fowlie and Reguant (2020),
Böringher, Lange and Rutherford (2014), Holladay et al (2018), Hemous (2016),
Baylis et al. (2014), Jakob, Marschinski and Hubler (2013), Fischer and Fox (2012,
2011), Fowlie (2009), and Hoel (1994).
2 Basic Model
Two countries, Home and Foreign, are endowed with energy deposits and with
labor, L and L∗. The ∗ distinguishes Foreign from Home, whose carbon policy we
seek to optimize.
There are three sectors: energy e, goods g, and services s. Energy is extracted
increase distortions associated with market power in that industry. Leakage compounds these
costs. They find that border adjustments induce negative leakage because of how industry actors
respond, and can generate significant welfare gains at high carbon prices.
3Hoel (1996) generalizes Markusen’s analysis and produces similar results in the context
of climate change and carbon taxes. He also considers the case where the country may not
impose tariffs. In this case, the optimal policy will involve carbon taxes that vary by sector
(even though the harms from emissions do not vary by sector).
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from deposits using labor, goods are produced by combining labor and energy,
and services are provided with labor only. As in DFS, goods come in a continuum,
indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Labor is perfectly mobile across the continuum of goods
and across the three sectors within a country.4
2.1 Preferences
Home preferences are represented as:
U = Cs +
∫ 1
0
u(cj)dj − ϕQWe . (1)
Here Cs is consumption of services, cj is consumption of good j, ϕ is the marginal






where η governs demand for goods relative to services and σ is the elasticity
of substitution between goods. We denote marginal utility as u′(c) = (η/c)1/σ.









we get U = Cs + u(Cg)− ϕQWe . Foreign preferences are the same except with η∗
and σ∗ (hence u∗) and ϕ∗.6
4What we call “labor” can be interpreted as a combination of labor and capital used to
extract energy, produce goods, and provide services.
5Prior to introducing multiple energy sources, including renewables, in Section 7, we equate
energy with a homogeneous fossil fuel measured by its carbon content.
6We follow Grossman and Helpman (1994) in adopting quasi-linear preferences, which greatly
simplifies the analysis. To ensure that the marginal utility of income is 1 we assume Cs > 0 and
C∗s > 0, a condition which is easily checked. If σ = 1 preferences simplify to:
U = Cs + η lnCg + ϕQ
W
e = Cs + η
∫ 1
0






Energy is deposited in a continuum of fields, characterized by different costs
of extraction. The quantity of energy that can be extracted at a unit labor
requirement below a is given by E(a) in Home and E∗(a) in Foreign.7 The






With Q∗e extracted in Foreign, global energy extraction is QWe = Qe +Q∗e. This
energy is used as an intermediate input by the goods sector.
Goods j ∈ [0, 1] are produced with input requirement aj in Home using a







where Lj is the labor input, Ej is the energy input, 0 < α < 1 is the output
elasticity of labor, and ν = αα (1− α)1−α. The production function in Foreign is
the same, but with a∗j in place of aj.8
Services, in quantitites Qs and Q∗s, are provided in both countries with a unit
labor requirement. We take services to be the numéraire, with price 1.9
2.3 International Trade
We assume that energy and services are costlessly traded between Home and
Foreign, with the relative price of energy denoted by pe. This price will dictate
outcomes in Foreign within the planning problem that we consider below. We will
also consider an unfettered competitive equilibrium of the model, which we call
7We set E(0) = E∗(0) = 0 and assume differentiability, with E′(a) > 0 and E∗′(a) > 0.
8In line with our Ricardian assumptions, we treat α as common across goods and countries.
Including the constant ν in the production function simplifies expressions for costs that will
appear later. This technology is nearly identical to the production and pollution technology in
Shapiro and Walker (2018), although α here is 1− α there. They use it to assess the reduction
of air pollution in US manufacturing from 1990-2008.
9We will assume that Q∗s > 0 so that, given the unit labor requirement for services, the wage
in Foreign is w∗ = 1. This outcome is guaranteed with a large enough labor endowment in
Foreign.
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the business as usual (BAU) baseline. We choose units of energy so that pe = 1
clears the global energy market in the BAU baseline. Hence, we can interpret the
parameter ϕW = ϕ+ ϕ∗ as the marginal global harm from combusting a unit of
fossil fuel relative to its value in a competitive-equilibrium.
Trade in the continuum of manufactured goods follows DFS. Goods are ordered
by Home comparative advantage:
a∗j
aj
= F (j). (4)
We assume that F (j) is continuous and strictly decreasing, with F (0) arbitrarily
large and F (1) = 0.10 Goods trade incurs iceberg costs τ ≥ 1 on Home exports
and τ ∗ ≥ 1 on Home imports . The total input requirement for Home to supply
good j to Foreign is thus τaj and for Foreign to supply good j to Home τ ∗a∗j .
2.4 Labor and Energy Requirements
We introduce notation for energy and labor input requirements that will be used
throughout the rest of the paper. At energy intensity, zj = Ej/Lj, we can invert




with corresponding unit labor requirement lj(zj) = ej(zj)/zj. Unit energy and
labor requirements in Foreign, e∗j(zj) and l∗j (zj), are defined in the same way but
with a∗j in place of aj.11
So as not to constrain the optimal policy, the energy intensity for good j
may depend not only on where the good is produced but also on where it is
shipped. For each good j we distinguish between Home exports, xj ≥ 0 and
Home production for consumption there, yj = qj − τxj ≥ 0. We also distinguish
10These assumptions on F (j) simplify the analysis of goods trade. To simplify aggregation
across goods, we assume that aj and a∗j are also continuous functions.
11Our unit energy requirement, ej(zj), is sometimes called emissions intensity in the environ-
mental economics literature, e.g. Shapiro and Walker (2018). We instead use the term energy
intensity for energy per worker, zj (by analogy to the common use of capital intensity for capital
per worker).
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between Home imports, mj ≥ 0 and Foreign production for consumption in
Foreign, y∗j = q∗j − τ ∗mj ≥ 0. (Here x and m are in terms of the quantity that
reaches the destination.) For each good j we allow for the possibility of four
different energy intensities zyj , zxj ,zmj , and z∗j , one for each of the four lines of
production yj, xj, mj, and y∗j .12
2.5 Carbon Accounting
We take a unit of energy to be a unit of carbon. Energy can be extracted in both
countries and Home may either export or import energy from Foreign. Carbon
is released when the energy is used to produce goods. These goods, embodying
carbon emissions, may be traded before being consumed by households. We can
therefore trace carbon from its extraction through its release into the atmosphere
and finally to its implicit consumption.
We define Ge as total intermediate demand for energy by the goods sector
in Home and G∗e by the goods sector in Foreign. Home net exports of energy,
positive or negative, are Qe −Ge. These expressions account for the first level of
trade in carbon.
The second level of trade in carbon is embodied in goods. Table 1 depicts the
bilateral flows, with rows indicating the location of consumption and columns the
location of production. For example, Home implicit consumption of carbon Ce
(in the upper right) is the sum of carbon released by producers in Home serving
the local market, CHHe , and carbon released by Foreign producers in supplying
Home imports, CHFe .
3 The Planning Problem
A planner allocates the resources that it controls to maximize Home welfare (1),
subject to three constraints: (i) its use of labor in the three sectors of the economy
cannot exceed its supply of labor; (ii) the global use of energy in manufacturing
cannot exceed global extraction of energy; and (iii) its policies cannot make
12Because Foreign can set z∗j independently from how it sets zmj , we do not include a so-called
Brussels effect, as suggested by Bradford (2020).
9








































Total Ge = CHHe + CFHe G∗e = CHFe + CFFe GWe = CWe = QWe .
Foreign worse off.13 Consumption, production, and energy extraction in Foreign
are dictated by market prices. We consider these outcomes in Foreign and set out
the constraints below before stating the planning problem.
3.1 Foreign
Energy extractors in Foreign can sell energy at price pe and can hire labor at wage
w∗ = 1. They tap all energy fields with a labor requirement below pe:
Q∗e = E
∗(pe). (6)
Goods producers can purchase energy at price pe and can hire labor at wage
w∗ = 1. Their cost-minimizing energy intensity is z∗ = (1 − α)/(αpe). They










Consumers in Foreign can purchase any good j from domestic producers at price
p∗j , creating an upper bound on their marginal utility, u∗′(c∗j) ≤ p∗j .
13We introduce the constraint on Foreign welfare to focus on policies that deal with the harm
from global emissions rather than on policies that manipulate the terms of trade in favor of
Home. To meet the Foreign welfare constraint, the planner can adjust transfers of services from




3.2.1 Home Labor Constraint

















Accounting for labor to provide services, Ls = Qs, Home’s labor constraint is:
Le + Lg + Ls = L. (9)
3.2.2 Global Energy Constraint
The global constraint on use of energy is:
Ge +G
∗
e ≤ Qe +Q∗e = QWe , (10)
where Qe is chosen by the planner and Q∗e is given by (6). Expressions for Ge and
G∗e, the quantity of energy used in production, are in the last row of Table 1.
3.2.3 Foreign Welfare Constraint
We require that the planner’s policy not reduce welfare in Foreign, yet Home has
no obligation to raise Foreign welfare either. Hence:
C∗s + u
∗(C∗g )− ϕ∗QWe = U∗BAU , (11)
where U∗BAU is Foreign welfare in the BAU baseline. In evaluating (11) below, we
will employ the Foreign analog of (9).
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3.3 The Planner’s Lagrangian
The planner’s objective is to maximize Home welfare, U = Cs + u(Cg)− ϕQWe ,
subject to the three constraints above: (9), (10), and (11). Substituting in the
labor constraint (9) and the Foreign welfare constraint (11) in place of Cs, the
objective becomes global welfare:14
U = u(Cg) + u
∗(C∗g )− ϕWQWe + L+ L∗ − Le − L∗e − Lg − L∗g − U∗BAU ,
where ϕW = ϕ+ ϕ∗ is the global marginal harm from emissions.
We apply a Lagrange multiplier λe to the energy constraint and drop the
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The terms are, line-by-line: (i) global utility from goods consumption less harm
from emissions, (ii) the opportunity cost (in terms of lost consumption of services)
from labor employed in energy extraction and goods production, and (iii) the
global energy constraint, weighted by the Lagrange multiplier.
Because the planner’s objective is global welfare, the Lagrangian encompasses
a number of different cases, which are determined by the resources that the planner
is assumed to control. In our core planning problem, to derive the unilateral
14Accounting for labor constraints, the supply of global services is:
Cs + C
∗
s = L+ L
∗ − Le − L∗e − Lg − L∗g.
Substituting in the Foreign welfare constraint in place of Foreign consumption of services yields
an expression for Home consumption of services:
Cs = L+ L
∗ − Le − L∗e − Lg − L∗g + u∗(C∗g )− ϕ∗QWe − U∗BAU .
Substituting into Home welfare yields the new expression for the planner’s objective.
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optimum, the planner can choose the quantities of each good that Home consumes
and each good that it exports, {yj}, {xj}, {mj}, their energy intensities, {zyj },
{zxj }, {zmj }, its energy extraction Qe, and the price of energy, pe. To derive the
global optimum, the planner can also choose {y∗j}, {z∗j }, and Q∗e.15 Restricting
the planner’s choices to narrower sets of variables allows us to derive simpler or
restricted policies to the unilateral optimum (which we explore in Section 5 and
in our simulations).
We solve the maximization problem, starting with what CDVW call the inner
problem, involving optimality conditions for an individual good given values for
Qe, λe, and pe. We then evaluate the optimality conditions for Qe and pe in what
they call the outer problem. The Lagrange multiplier λe clears the energy market.
The results that follow become more intuitive by anticipating that the solution
satisfies λe ≥ pe, with a strict inequality in all but extreme cases. This inequality
is derived in Appendix B.2. In the case of ϕW = 0 we get λe = pe and the
planner’s problem collapses to the BAU baseline.
3.4 Inner Problem
The inner problem is to maximize a Lagrangian for any arbitrary good j:
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We consider, in turn: (i) optimal energy intensities, zyj , zmj , and zxj ; (ii) optimal
quantities for Home consumers, yj and mj ; and (iii) optimal quantities for Foreign
consumers, xj.
3.4.1 Energy Intensity
The optimal energy intensities zyj and zxj solve minz {lj(z) + λeej(z)} while zmj
solves minz
{




. Using (5) it is apparent that in all three cases, the











The planner chooses a common energy intensity z for the production of any good
consumed in Home (whether produced in Home or Foreign) and for all production
in Home (whether serving consumers in Home or Foreign).
For any good produced in Home for domestic consumption the energy require-
ment is:
ej(z) = (1− α)ajλ−αe
while the overall shadow cost is
lj(z) + λeej(z) = ajλ
1−α
e .
If good j is exported from Home, the shadow cost is τajλ1−αe , while if it is imported
by Home, the shadow cost is
τ ∗
(







3.4.2 Goods for Home Consumers
The pair of first order conditions for yj and mj, after substituting in results for
shadow costs, can be written as:
u′(yj +mj)− ajλ1−αe ≤ 0,
with equality if yj > 0, and
u′(yj +mj)− τ ∗a∗jλ1−αe ≤ 0,
with equality if mj > 0. To help process these conditions we define j̄m, separating






The threshold j̄m delivers a concise statement of Home consumption and where
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it is produced. If j < j̄m, Home has a comparative advantage in the good, the
second condition holds with a strict inequality (so that mj = 0), and the first holds
with equality to determine yj. If j > j̄m, Foreign has a comparative advantage in
the good, the first condition holds with a strict inequality (so that yj = 0), and
the second holds with equality to determine mj.
3.4.3 Goods for Foreign Consumers
To characterize the solution for Home exports, and Foreign consumption more
generally, we need to consider three regions of the unit interval of goods. As noted
above, Foreign’s marginal utility for good j is capped by p∗j , the cost (7) at which
it can supply the good to itself. Whether or not that upper bound binds sets the
boundary for Region 1, the goods j for which Foreign’s marginal utility remains
strictly below p∗j . In this case we know y∗j = 0 so that Foreign consumption is
c∗j = xj. Regions 2 and 3 pertain to goods j for which Foreign’s marginal utility
equals p∗j . Because marginal utility is fixed at p∗j , c∗j is invariant to a decline in xj :
a decline in xj will be exactly offset by a rise in y∗j to keep marginal utility equal
to p∗j . Region 2 is the set of goods where (7) binds and Home exports the goods
to Foreign, while in Region 3 is the set of goods where (7) binds and Foreign
produces them for itself.
Consider a good j in Region 1. The first order condition for xj equates Foreign
marginal utility to the shadow cost of Home producing and delivering the good
to the Foreign market:
u∗′(xj)− τajλ1−αe = 0.
This shadow cost is strictly below p∗j for any good j < j0, where j0 satisfies:






Region 1 consists of goods j ∈ [0, j0).
Now consider a good j in either Region 2 or 3, so that j ≥ j0. Foreign’s
marginal utility no longer depends on xj, since c∗j is fixed. Resources used in
Foreign, however, are reduced when xj increases, since y∗j = c∗j − xj. After
15
substituting in the relevant shadow values, the derivative of the Lagrangian is:
∂Lj
∂xj
= −τajλ1−αe + l∗j (z∗) + λee∗j(z∗). (15)
The right-hand side of (15) is the planner’s value of the global resources saved
by increasing xj. The last two terms capture the labor (valued at 1) and energy
(valued at λe by the planner) that Foreign would have used to produce an additional
unit of good j for itself. This derivative is predicated on y∗j > 0, but otherwise
doesn’t depend on xj.
Based on (15) we define j̄x, separating goods in Region 3 that Foreign produces
for itself from those that Home exports to it. This threshold satisfies:





α + (1− α)λe
pe
. (16)
For λe > pe it follows that j̄x > j0.
The threshold j̄x delivers a concise statement of Foreign consumption and
where it is produced, separating goods in Regions 2 from those in Region 3. For
goods in Region 3, with j > j̄x, Foreign has a strong comparative advantage and
xj = 0. The value that the planner places on the resources saved in Foreign
doesn’t offset the shadow cost of Home producing the good for export. For goods
in Region 2, with j ∈ [j0, j̄x), Home’s comparative advantage is stronger so that
(15) is strictly positive. Exports rise until y∗j is driven to zero. The quantity
exported equates Foreign’s marginal utility to p∗j :
u∗′(xj)− a∗jp1−αe = 0.
By replacing xj with y∗j , this same condition also applies to j > j̄x.
Table 2 displays the results of the inner problem. As in Table 1, the rows
indicate the location of consumption while the columns indicate the location of
production. These terms are as expected except for Home exports, xj, for goods
in Region 2, with j ∈ (j0, j̄x): (i) exports of such goods reflect the price of energy
pe in Foreign rather than the planner’s shadow price λe, (ii) although produced in
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Table 2: Production and Distribution of a Good
Home Foreign
Home yj = η (ajλ1−αe )
−σ


















)−σ∗ j < j0
j0 ≤ j < j̄x
y∗j = η
∗ (a∗jp1−αe )−σ∗ j > j̄x
Thresholds: F (j̄m) = 1/τ∗, F (j0) = τ(λe/pe)1−α, and F (j̄x) =
τ(λe/pe)1−α
α+(1−α)λe/pe
Home, they reflect Foreign’s input requirement a∗j rather than Home’s, and (iii)
they do not reflect the iceberg costs of export τ . That is, xj 6= η∗ (τajλ1−αe )
−σ in
Region 2, as is the case in Region 1, with j ≤ j0. The reason is that for goods in
Region 2 Home crowds out Foreign production in order to produce these goods
with lower energy intensity, but its comparative advantage in these goods is not
strong enough to justify exporting enough to push Foreign marginal utility below
p∗j .16
3.5 Outer Problem
We now turn to the optimality conditions for Qe and pe, rewriting the Lagrangian
in terms of aggregate magnitudes:
L = u(Cg) + u∗(C∗g )− ϕW (Qe +Q∗e)
− Le − L∗e − Lg − L∗g − λe (Ge +G∗e −Qe −Q∗e) . (17)
3.5.1 Energy Extraction
The first order condition with respect to Qe is:
∂L
∂Qe
= −ϕW − ∂Le
∂Qe
+ λe ≤ 0,
16While Table 2 doesn’t provide the outcomes for goods j = j̄m and j = j̄x, they won’t matter
for aggregate results. To obtain BAU outcomes, replace λe with pe throughout the table.
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with equality if Qe > 0. The extra labor to extract a bit more energy in Home is
the labor requirement for the marginal energy field there, E−1 (Qe).17 Applying






for λe − ϕW ≥ 0 and Qe = 0 otherwise. (To obtain the BAU outcome, replace
λe − ϕW with pe, as with Foreign extraction (6).)
3.5.2 Energy Price






























To make sense of this condition requires computing the partial derivatives of C∗g ,
Q∗e, L∗e, Lg, L∗g, Ge, and G∗e, each evaluated at the optimal unilateral policy itself.
Foreign energy extraction depends directly on the energy price, via (6), so that
∂Q∗e/∂pe = E
∗′(pe). The response of Foreign employment in the energy sector
is ∂L∗e/∂pe = peE∗′(pe). Dependence on the energy price is more subtle for the
other aggregates as pieces of them have already been chosen by the planner in
the inner problem.18
In Appendix B we compute all the partial derivatives and substitute them


























depends on the energy price only through the first integral, CFFe . The partial derivative we
18
into the first order condition above to get:
(
λe − ϕW − pe
) ∂Q∗e
∂pe













This optimality condition balances Foreign supply and demand responses to a
change in pe with the deviation between the planner’s valuation and the Foreign
market valuation of each response. We refer to these deviations as wedges: (i) the
wedge between the planner’s marginal valuation of a unit of energy extracted and
the energy price (extraction wedge), (ii) the wedge between the planner’s marginal




e − p∗j ,
for each good in Region 2, with j ∈ (j0, j̄x), between the shadow cost of Home
supplying exports of j and the marginal utility to consumers in Foreign (export
wedges).
We get a compact expression for the energy-price condition by aggregating





We can then rewrite (19) as:
λe − pe =
ϕW ε∗SQ
∗




















A change in the energy price affects Foreign’s use of energy only through its domestic consumption
CFFe and not through its exports of goods to Home CHFe . The planner has chosen and optimized







D = α + (1− α)σ∗. (21)
3.6 Properties of the Solution
We can now compute the optimal policy: (i) the inner problem gives Ge and G∗e
in terms of pe and λe, (ii) equations (6) and (18) give Q∗e and Qe as functions of pe
and λe, and (iii) equation (19) and the global energy constraint (10), which binds,
nail down pe and λe. We can also go further in characterizing the optimal wedges.
3.6.1 The Pigouvian Wedge
Adding the absolute value of the extraction wedge and the consumption wedge
yields ϕW , the marginal global externality from carbon emissions. The wedge
between extraction and use of energy in Home is Pigouvian. As shown in Appendix
A, a global planner, that could also control outcomes in Foreign, would impose
this Pigouvian wedge there as well. A unilaterally optimal policy cannot achieve
that international uniformity, yet still imposes the Pigouvian wedge in Home.
3.6.2 Balancing Extraction and Consumption Wedges
Appendix B.2 shows that the planner picks the consumption wedge, λe − pe, from
the interval [0, ϕW ), strictly positive if ϕW ε∗SQ∗e > 0.
The consumption wedge will approach the upper bound of ϕW if ε∗SQ∗e is large
relative to ε∗DCFFe . In this case the planner chooses a low energy price to limit
Foreign extraction of energy. As the consumption wedge approaches this upper
bound the extraction wedge approaches 0.
The consumption wedge will approach the lower bound if ε∗SQ∗e is small relative
to ε∗DCFFe . In this case the planner chooses a high price to limit Foreign demand
for energy. With perfectly inelastic Foreign supply, the extraction wedge equals
19The supply elasticity will typically be a function of the energy price while the demand
elasticity is a constant, depending on both the elasticity α of the unit energy requirement for
producing a good and the elasticity (1− α)σ∗ of the quantity demanded with respect to the
energy price. With α close to 1, so too will be ε∗D for moderate values of σ
∗.
20
the Pigouvian wedge and the consumption wedge is 0. The unilateral policy then
achieves the global optimum.20
The Pigouvian wedge, together with the consumption wedge, completely
characterize the optimal policy if iceberg costs become arbitrarily large, driving
out trade in goods. In this case, the import and export thresholds approach the
corner solutions of j̄m = 1 and j̄x = 0, and hence CFFe = C∗e . Equation (20),
which determines the magnitude of the consumption wedge, collapses to:












This case serves as a useful benchmark. As we bring back trade in goods, the new
elements of the optimal policy are the treatment of goods imports and particularly
goods exports.
3.6.3 Export Wedges and Crosshauling
The import threshold, j̄m, is the same under the optimal policy as under BAU.
The export threshold is greater, j̄x > j̄x,BAU .21 The planner implicitly subsidizes
exports of goods in Region 2, with j ∈ (j0, j̄x), as dictated by the export wedges,
sj. The logic for this subsidy follows from (15): global resources are saved by
producing Region 2 goods in Home rather than Foreign.
These properties of the solution create the possibility for crosshauling. Under
the optimal policy there may be a set of goods that Home simultaneously imports
and exports. Such a set of goods always exists in the absence of trade costs since
then F (j̄m) = 1 while F (j̄x) < F (j̄x,BAU) = 1 implying j̄x > j̄m.22
20Following this logic, Harstad (2012) makes a case that the policy maker buy marginal energy
fields from Foreign to create a locally vertical Foreign supply curve. We have ruled out such an
international market in Foreign energy fields in our analysis here.
21Denote the right-hand side of (16) by f(λe/pe). Evaluating it at λe/pe = 1 gives f(1) = τ ,
hence j̄x = j̄x,BAU if λe = pe. Differentiating it:
∂f(λe/pe)
∂(λe/pe)









which is negative for λe/pe > 1. Since λe > pe for ϕW > 0 it follows that F (j̄x) < F (j̄x,BAU )
and hence j̄x > j̄x,BAU .
22The economic rationale for crosshauling is to save global resources, with labor valued at
21
Trade costs mute this effect. With high enough trade costs F (j̄x) > F (j̄m) so
that j̄x < j̄m. The inherent inefficiency of crosshauling overcomes its advantage in
reducing the shadow value of resources used in production. Yet, even when there
is no crosshauling the optimal policy broadens the range of goods that Home
exports. The planner controls energy intensity not only for all production in
Home but also for production in Foreign that Home imports. Goods produced
in Foreign, for consumption there, escape the policy. The planner uses exports
to reduce Foreign production for itself, with the export wedge inducing Foreign
consumers to buy them.
4 Optimal Taxes and Subsidies
We now describe a set of taxes and subsidies that deliver the optimal outcomes
in a competitive equilibrium. In shifting from a planning problem to a market
economy, recall that services are the numéraire and the unit labor requirement
for services pins the wage to 1 in both countries. We treat pe as the global energy
price, the base to which we apply carbon taxes. The taxes and subsidies we
introduce into this competitive equilibrium must generate the wedges that appear
in the optimal policy.
4.1 A Simple Implementation
We focus on an implementation that is easy to describe, with three elements of
intervention:




1 and energy valued at λe. To make the argument precise, we exploit results from the inner
problem. If ϕW > 0 then for any j ∈ (j0, j̄x) the planner saves resources if j is produced in
Home and exported rather than being produced in Foreign (see Section 3.4.3). For any j < j̄m
the planner saves resources if j is produced in Foreign and imported rather than being produced
in Home (see Section 3.4.2). In the absence of trade costs, τ = τ∗ = 1, we have j̄m ∈ (j0, j̄x). In
this case there is a range of goods j ∈ (j0, j̄m) for which resources are saved (in both directions)
if Home produces them for Foreign consumers while Foreign produces them for Home consumers.
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2. Impose a border adjustment, tb, on Home imports or exports of energy and














3. Provide an export subsidy sj per unit exported of any good in Region 2,
j ∈ (j0, j̄x), equal to the export wedge:
sj = τaj(pe + tb)
1−α − p∗j ,
where F (j0) = τ (1 + tb/pe)
1−α and F (j̄x) = F (j0)α+(1−α)tb/pe .
The resulting effective extraction tax te equals the absolute value of the extraction
wedge, te = tNe − tb. In the special case of ϕW = 0 there are no wedges and
the optimal policy sets tNe = tb = 0 and sj = 0 for all j, resulting in the BAU
competitive equilibrium.
4.2 After-Tax Prices
To eliminate ambiguity about how this policy would work, we list the net prices
faced by the different agents in the global economy:
1. The global price of energy, pe, is paid by users of energy in Foreign and is
received by energy extractors in Foreign.
2. If energy is imported by Home, it is subject to a border adjustment tb,
raising the price of energy for users in Home to pe + tb.
3. Energy extractors in Home sell energy domestically at price pe + tb, but
after paying the extraction tax they net pe + tb − tNe = pe − te.
4. If energy is exported by Home, extractors get price pe plus a partial rebate
of tb on the nominal extraction tax they paid. The border adjustment leaves
their net price pe − te the same as if they sell domestically.
5. Goods j < j̄m are produced in Home, using energy costing pe + tb, so that
local consumers pay pj = aj(pe + tb)1−α.
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6. Goods j > j̄m are imported by Home. Foreign produces them with energy
intensity z, anticipating the border adjustment. Their cost of production
(including delivery to Home) is τ ∗l∗j (z) + peτ ∗e∗j(z). Adding in the border
adjustment, tbτ ∗e∗j(z), the price to consumers in Home becomes pmj =
τ ∗a∗j(pe + tb)
1−α.
7. Goods j < j0 are produced in Home and exported. The producers use
energy costing pe + tb, with no adjustment when the goods are exported.
The price in Foreign, including the trade cost, is pxj = τaj(pe + tb)1−α.
8. Goods in Region 2, j ∈ (j0, j̄x), are also exported by Home. The producers
use energy priced at pe + tb, with no relief from the energy tax when the
goods are exported. They sell at price pxj = p∗j = a∗jp1−αe in Foreign, but get
a subsidy from Home of sj per unit so that p∗j + sj = τaj(pe + tb)1−α covers
their cost.
9. Goods j > j̄x are produced in Foreign, using energy at price pe. They are
sold to local consumers at price p∗j = a∗jp1−αe .
4.3 Discussion
We can understand the optimal tax rates by considering how they are shaped by
responses in Foreign. Extraction in Foreign and production of goods there for local
consumption face no tax but respond to the equilibrium price of energy. Foreign
use of energy in production has two components: the energy intensity of this
production (the intensive margin) and the set of goods produced (the extensive
margin). These three margins—Foreign extraction, Foreign energy intensity, and
the range of goods produced in Foreign for local consumers—can be thought of as
three different sources of leakage. Home sets its combination of an extraction tax,
a border adjustment, and an export subsidy to indirectly affect these margins, in
effect controlling all these sources of leakage.
If Foreign’s extraction elasticity is large, extraction leakage is potentially high,
resulting in costs to Home that go up with ϕW . Border adjustments on energy
moderate this effect. Increasing the border adjustment lowers the price of energy,
thereby reducing extraction leakage. Lowering pe, however, introduces distortions
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on the production and consumption side. As pe goes down, the set of goods
produced in Foreign increases, and Foreign’s energy intensity in producing those
goods goes up. The set of goods produced in Foreign roughly corresponds to
traditional (production) leakage, while the energy intensity of those goods is
sometimes called the “fuel price effect.”23 The principle of optimizing over the two
tax instruments, te and tb, given te + tb = tNe = ϕW , is at the heart of the seminal
paper of Markusen (1975).24
The optimal policy also controls production leakage through a combination of
a border adjustment on imports and a goods-specific subsidy for exports. The
border tax on imports means that imports face the same effective energy price as
goods produced in Home. As a result, the border tax leaves the extensive margin
for imports the same as without tax and causes the energy intensity of imports to
be the same as that of goods produced in Home. The policy might have controlled
the export margin in a parallel fashion, by rebating taxes on export, leaving the
export margin the same as it would be without tax. Doing so, however, would
remove the incentive for exporters to lower their energy intensity. Rather than
removing the tax on export, therefore, the policy offers good specific subsidies.
Because these subsidies do not depend on energy usage, they retain incentives for
exporters in Home to produce goods with low energy intensity.25
The subsidy goes beyond merely restoring Home’s export margin: it applies
to goods for which Home would not be competitive in the absence of any carbon
23These terms, however, are not clearly distinguished in the literature, and our use of them is
only suggestive. The fuel price effect appears to refer to any change in Foreign production or
consumption due to a reduction in pe. If true, then traditional production leakage is limited to
shifts in import or export margins holding pe fixed. Our usage does not precisely correspond to
these definitions because our expressions all use the equilibrium value of pe.
24This connection to Markusen (1975) is disguised by differences in terminology. Our extraction
tax is what he refers to as a production tax. Our border adjustment is what he refers to as a
trade tax. Furthermore, his taxes are ad valorem while ours are specific. More fundamentally, he
imposes trade balance, so that his trade tax incorporates terms-of-trade considerations. Finally,
in his model there is no analog of our production sector, which uses energy to produce tradable
goods. Hence, his analysis doesn’t speak to how the border adjustment applies to the energy
embodied in these goods.
25This basic logic comes from Fischer and Fox (2012), who point out that rebating carbon tax
revenue to producers, in proportion to their production (without regard to their tax payments),
retains the incentive for them to use less carbon. An optimal subsidy to production in the
context of carbon pricing emerges in Fowlie et al. (2016). There it is designed to offset the
output-reducing effect of market power among cement producers.
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policy. The reason follows the argument above for potential cross-hauling under
the optimal policy. The policy is designed to crowd out some of Foreign’s
energy-intensive production for its domestic consumers. The same logic does
not apply to the import margin because the border tax on imports ensures that
all goods consumed in Home are produced with the same (low) energy intensity.
The asymmetry between imports and exports arises because a unilateral policy
can’t directly control the energy intensity of goods produced in Foreign that are
consumed in Foreign. The optimal export policy seeks to crowd out this activity.
5 Constrained Optimal Policies
To assess the optimal policy, we compare it to more conventional polices: an
extraction tax, a consumption tax, and a production tax. We also consider hybrids
of these taxes, which are optimal combinations of the three conventional policies.
We derive each policy as a variant of the planner’s problem from Section 3.
The Lagrangian (12) remains the same in each case, but is solved assuming that
the planner can control only those variables subject to a given policy. For example,
the planner may only control Qe and pe, with all other variables determined in the
competitive equilibrium. The resulting policy is a tax only on domestic extraction
(a basic extraction tax).
Full solutions to the Lagrangian for each case are shown in Appendix C. Here
we focus on the optimality condition for pe, which conveys the essential intuition
for all such policies, and then show how the solution can be implemented through
taxes.
5.1 The Planner’s Solution
We can write the conditions for pe for each of the constrained policies in terms of
the first two wedges seen in the optimal policy, the extraction wedge, λe−ϕW −pe,
and the consumption wedge, λe − pe. In each case, the planner uses the wedge to
evaluate the cost of the corresponding response outside of its control. The planner
sets the size of these marginal costs equal to each other.
Returning to the problem that leads to an optimal extraction tax, the planner
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chooses Qe according to (18) while Foreign extraction remains outside its control.
The planner does not control the demand side of the market in either region, so
the global consumption response is also outside its control. The condition for pe
balances the cost of the Foreign extraction response and the cost of the global
demand response to changes in pe:
(
λe − ϕW − pe
) ∂Q∗e
∂pe




The same logic holds for constraints on the planner that generate a consumption
tax and a hybrid of extraction and consumption taxes. In each case, the planner
sets the marginal cost due to the extraction wedge equal to marginal cost due to
the appropriate consumption wedge. Table 3 summarizes the conditions for pe for
these cases.
Table 3: Conditions for Policies Leading to Extraction and Consumption Taxes
Extraction tax
(
λe − ϕW − pe
) ∂Q∗e
∂pe
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The optimal solution when the planner controls only domestic production
(leading to a basic production tax) is more complex. The policy changes the
cost of energy to producers in Home relative to the cost to producers in Foreign,
which means that the trade margins j̄x and j̄m change. These changes generate
traditional production leakage, which the planner must take into account.
Let re be the relative cost of energy in Home. Raising this relative cost
generates leakage, defined as (minus) the resulting increase in energy use in







The planner chooses re so that:26
λe − repe = Λ(λe − pe),
thus reducing the cost of energy to Home producers repe (relative to its shadow
value λe) with greater leakage (holding fixed the consumption wedge). If trade
costs are large enough leakage is no longer a concern: Λ approaches zero, repe
approaches λe, and a production tax becomes like a consumption tax.
The consumption wedge itself also adjusts to production leakage. We can
write the condition for pe in terms of the extraction and consumption wedges:
(
λe − ϕW − pe
) ∂QWe
∂pe









Because the planner doesn’t control either domestic or Foreign extraction, the
extraction wedge is multiplied by the change in QWe . On the demand side, the
planner cares about both the direct effect of the energy price on Foreign use of
energy and the indirect effect through Home energy use via production leakage.
If the planner controls all goods produced domestically (no matter where
consumed) and all goods consumed domestically (no matter where produced), the
resulting policy is a hybrid of a basic production tax and a basic consumption
tax. In this case, only CFFe and CFHe are outside the reach of the planner, on the






The condition for pe is:
(
λe − ϕW − pe
) ∂QWe
∂pe









26In terms of the choice variables in the Lagrangian (12), allowing the planner to choose
re is equivalent to the planner choosing pe and z, restricting zxj = z
y







)1−α)−σ∗ (or xj = 0 if τaj ( 1−ααz )1−α ≥ a∗jp1−αe ) and yj = η (aj ( 1−ααz )1−α)−σ (or




)1−α ≥ τ∗a∗jp1−αe ). The formulation in terms of re is more convenient.
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5.2 Taxes and Implementation
Implementing these outcomes involves imposing extraction, production, and
consumption taxes, as the case may be, for each policy. If there is an extraction
tax it equals the extraction wedge, te = λe−ϕW−pe; if there is a consumption tax it
equals the consumption wedge, tc = λe−pe; and if there is a production tax it equals
the consumption wedge reduced by the extent of leakage, tp = (1− Λ)(λe − pe).
Table 4 summarizes the effective taxes for each case in terms of the consumption
wedge. The last column gives the expressions for the consumption wedge itself,
stated in terms of the Foreign elasticities of supply and demand defined in (21),
the global elasticities of supply and demand, εWS and εWD , and the elasticities of
energy use in Home and Foreign, εG and ε∗G.27
If Home imposes one of the basic taxes–an extraction tax, a production tax,
or a consumption tax–the rate is below the Pigouvian wedge, ϕW . In the case of
an extraction tax, the planner will choose a lower tax rate because of concerns
that a higher rate would stimulate Foreign extraction, as determined by ε∗SQ∗e. If
Home imposes a consumption tax, the planner chooses a lower tax rate because
of concerns that a higher rate would stimulate Foreign demand, as determined by
ε∗DC
∗
e . For a production tax, it is not only ε∗GG∗e that keeps the rate below ϕW ,
but also the degree of production leakage, Λ. With 100% production leakage, the
optimal production tax rate is 0.
Turning to the hybrid policies, when Home combines an extraction tax with a
consumption tax, it can control both sides of the market and the overall tax rate
te + tc equals the Pigouvian wedge, as with the optimal unilateral policy. This
result does not carry over to a combination of an extraction and production tax,
however. The extraction component is set equal to the extraction wedge, but the
27Defining εS and εD as Home’s analogs of the Foreign elasticities in (21), the global elasticities
are the weighted sums:
εWS = (Qe/Q
W

















The energy use elasticities are:
εG = (C
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Table 4: Effective Taxes
Policy Effective Taxes λe − pe
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tp = (1− Λ)(λe − pe)


















W − (λe − pe)
tp = (1− Λ)(λe − pe)















production component is less than the consumption wedge by the factor 1− Λ.
Leakage reduces the power of this hybrid compared to the extraction/consumption
hybrid.
While an extraction/production hybrid tax has to contend with production
leakage, it has an offsetting advantage over other policies: it can be implemented
simply and accurately. To implement this tax, Home would impose a nominal
extraction tax of tNe = te+tp = ϕW− Λ1−Λtp and border adjustments on energy (but
not on goods) at rate tb = tp. By avoiding border adjustments on goods, the tax
avoids the need to estimate the marginal emissions from the production of goods
in foreign countries, which is the key problem in imposing border adjustments.
(Kortum and Weisbach (2016)).
Turning to the production/consumption tax hybrid, if there were no production
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leakage the planner would equalize the tax rates, as in the optimal unilateral
policy: all production and all consumption in Home would be taxed the same way.
In this case, Home could impose a production tax at a rate equal to λe− pe and a
tax on imports at the same rate. With positive production leakage the planner
lowers the tax on Home’s exports. To implement the policy, Home would again
impose a production tax of λe − pe, a border tax on imports at that same rate,
but now would add a rebate on exports of Λ(λe − pe). In either case, the tax is
lower than ϕW because this hybrid acts only on the demand side of the energy
market.
Finally, when Home can impose the combination of all three taxes, the sum of
the extraction and consumption rates is equal to the Pigouvian rate, as with the
hybrid of just those two taxes. The production tax rate, which applies only to
exports, however, is lower due to a concern about leakage. As leakage goes up,
the use of the production tax goes down (and the planner also shifts away from
consumption taxes and toward extraction taxes).
6 Quantitative Illustration
We now turn to the quantitative implications of the optimal policy. We pursue
a strategy, based on Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007), calibrating the BAU
competitive equilibrium to data on global carbon flows and then computing the
optimal policy relative to this baseline. We also compare the BAU and optimal
policies to the more conventional policies derived in the previous section.28
6.1 Setup
We start by providing the basic elements of our procedure (with a full treatment
relegated to Appendix D), and then present our key results.
28In principle we could incorporate a set of existing taxes into the baseline. We chose not to
do so in order to keep the analysis that follows as simple as possible and because existing taxes
on carbon are quite limited.
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6.1.1 Functional Forms
To solve the model numerically we employ convenient functional forms for the
distributions of energy fields, E(a) and E∗(a), for unit labor requirements to
produce goods, aj and a∗j , and hence also for the comparative advantage curve,
F (j).
Energy Supply We parameterize the distribution of energy fields by treating
the supply elasticities, εS and ε∗S, as parameters so that for a ≥ 0:
E(a) = EaεS ; E∗(a) = E∗aε
∗
S ,
where E and E∗ are shift parameters.
Comparative Advantage We parameterize the efficiency of the goods sector












where A and A∗ determine absolute advantage in either country, and θ determines
(inversely) the scope of comparative advantage. Taking the ratio of these two












This functional form allows us to solve for the import and export thresholds in
the BAU. From (13), the BAU import margin is:
j̄m =
A
A+ (τ ∗)−θ A∗
,






Table 5: Baseline Calibration for Home as the OECD
Home Foreign Total
Home CHHe = 11.3 CHFe = 2.5 Ce = 13.8
Foreign CFHe = 0.9 CFFe = 17.6 C∗e = 18.5
Total Ge = 12.2 G∗e = 20.1 GWe = CWe = 32.3
Extraction Qe = 8.6 Q∗e =23.7 QWe = 32.3
6.1.2 Calibration of BAU Scenario.
We calibrate the BAU baseline to carbon accounting data for 2015 from the Trade
Embodied in CO2 (TECO2) database made available by the OECD.29 Units are
gigatonnes of CO2. Energy extraction data for 2015 is from the International
Energy Agency World Energy Statistics Database. We use emissions factors to
convert units of energy to units of CO2.
For most of our results, members of the OECD form the taxing region, or
Home, and the non-OECD countries are Foreign. Table 5 provides the data that
we calibrate to. By this CO2 metric the OECD represents about one-third of the
world. It represents a smaller share of extraction and a larger share of implicit
consumption, nearly twenty percent of which is imported.
Two examples provide the basic logic for how we can calibrate the model to
the data in Table 5. As noted in Section 2.3, we choose units of energy so that
in the BAU baseline the global energy price is 1. Hence baseline extraction is
E = Qe and E∗ = Q∗e. In the BAU baseline a country’s average spending per
good doesn’t depend on the source of the good. Since the share of energy in the
cost of any good is the same, in the baseline j̄m = CHHe /Ce and j̄x = CFHe /C∗e .
In addition to the carbon accounting data, we need values for six parameters:
θ, εS, ε∗S, σ, σ∗, and α, the last three of which determine the demand elasticities,
εD and ε∗D.30 Table 6 lists our central values for these parameters, which we have
29The values that we take from TECO2 are broadly consistent with those available from the
Global Carbon Project.
30The eight other parameters: A, A∗, E, E∗, η, η∗, τ , and τ∗ are all subsumed by calibrating
to the carbon accounts.
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determined using a variety of sources.31 Appendix E provides additional details
on our calibration procedure.
Prior studies, such as Elliott et. al. (2009) show that the foreign elasticity of
energy supply, ε∗s, is the key parameter affecting leakage and the effectiveness of
a production tax. We estimate that εS = ε∗S = 0.5 using data in Asker, Collard-
Wexler, and De Loecker (2018), by fitting the slope of E(a) and E∗(a) among oil
fields with costs above the median. Based on a literature review, Kotchen (2021)
uses much higher values for the United States, with a point estimate for coal of
εcoals = 1.9, for natural gas of εNGs = 1.6, and for gasoline of εgass = 2.0. To account
for the uncertainty in these values, we show most of our results using both our
baseline calibration and also setting ε∗s = 2.0.
6.1.3 From BAU to Optimal
For any endogenous variable x we denote the value under the optimal policy
as x(pe, tb), where tNe = ϕW if tb > 0. In the BAU baseline the value is x(1, 0),
denoted simply as x.32
Under the optimal policy, Home energy extraction is simply:
Qe(pe, tb) =
(
pe + tb − ϕW
)εS Qe,
for pe + tb − ϕW ≥ 0 and Qe(pe, tb) = 0 otherwise. Foreign extraction is even
31We choose α = 0.85 based on the ratio of the value of energy used in production to value
added. (In our model that ratio is (1− α)/α.) We take θ = 4 based on the preferred estimate
in Simonovska and Waugh (2014). The values for σ = σ∗ = 1 are chosen as a compromise
between a likely higher elasticity of substitution between individual goods and a lower elasticity
of demand for the goods aggregate. Note that neither εD nor ε∗D are very sensitive to this choice
of σ and σ∗ since α is close to 1.
32In the BAU baseline tNe = 0. While we model specific taxes, their magnitudes have an
ad-valorem interpretation relative to the baseline energy price of 1.
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simpler:





The import margin for the optimal policy is unchanged from the BAU baseline,
while the export margin changes to:
j̄x(pe, tb) =
(pe + (1− α) tb)θ CFHe
(pe + (1− α) tb)θ CFHe +
(
pαe (pe + tb)
1−α)θ CFFe .
Consumption of energy in Foreign from Foreign production is:








Appendix D provides a step-by-step derivation of all such terms under the optimal
policy.
To compute the optimal border adjustment tb along with the equilibrium
energy price pe, we require that they clear the global energy market and satisfy
(22). In particular, we require:






e(pe, tb)− σ∗(1− α)S(pe, tb)
ε∗SQ
∗






Our algorithm simply iterates between the first two equations until we find the
vector (pe, tb) that satisfies them both. We follow similar procedures for the
optimal constrained policies.
We can evaluate any outcome of the model at the equilibrium (pe, tb) to explore
the implications of the optimal policy. A key implication is the welfare benefit
of the policy to Home. Our measure starts with the change in the planner’s
objective, U(pe, tb)−U . This term is equivalent to increased spending on services
by Home, since consumption of services enters preferences linearly with price 1.
To interpret the magnitude, and to make it scale free, we normalize it by Home
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(U(pe, tb)− U) .
Our script is in Matlab. We use the solving procedure described above rather




Figure 1: Optimal Policy in the OECD
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We begin with a simulation of the optimal policy in the OECD (Figure 1). We
illustrate the policy for marginal harm ranging from ϕW = 0 to ϕW = 2, showing
the result for our baseline calibration of ε∗S = 0.5 and for ε∗S = 2.0. We show (i)
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the emissions reductions, (ii) the change in welfare (W ), (iii) the change in pe, (iv)
the tax rates under the optimal policy, (v) the change in Home’s export margin,
j̄x, and (vi) the maximum export subsidy.33
Focusing on our baseline calibration, global emissions go down by about 1⁄4
when ϕW = 2, a substantial reduction given that emissions in the OECD are only
about 1⁄3 of global emissions (as reflected in the value of Ge in Table 5). Note
that the substantial reduction from the OECD policy does not mean that the
OECD’s emissions are near zero. Some of the reductions arise in other parts of
the world because of how the optimal policy expands the carbon price to trading
partners. Notably, the OECD would choose to impose a significant carbon policy
even when the rest of the world does not.
With ε∗s = 0.5, Home relies substantially on the extraction tax. The value of
te is always higher than tb, and increasingly so as ϕW goes up. The optimal tax
rates range from 0 to up to about 1.5 times the initial (BAU) price of energy.
The OECD’s policy, however, still pushes the energy price (top middle) below 1
until ϕW approaches 1.5. For even higher values of ϕW , the net price received by
energy extractors in the OECD, pe − te, approaches zero. As a result, extraction
in the OECD hits zero as ϕW approaches 2, which can be seen in the kink in the
lines for high values of ϕW .
Examining the two graphs on the right-hand column of Figure 1, we can see
that Home expands its export margin as marginal damages increase. By expanding
its export margin, Home is able to broaden the application of its carbon policy,
which becomes more important as the marginal harm from emissions increases.
This feature of the policy comes at a cost that rises with ϕW .
Our alternative calibration sets ε∗s = 2.0. With a higher foreign elasticity of
energy supply, Home makes less use of an extraction tax, because the tax would
induce a significant response in Foreign. Instead, Home shifts most of the tax
33The maximum export subsidy is on Home’s marginal export good, j̄x. The figure expresses
this maximum subsidy relative to Home’s cost of producing and delivering the good to Foreign.





1 + (1− α)tb/pe
.
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to the demand side: in the bottom middle panel, tb now exceeds te. The value
of pe, correspondingly, goes down. Because Home relies more on demand-side
taxes, it adjusts the trade margins more aggressively, as seen in the two right
hand panels. Notably, emissions reductions (top left panel) are similar in the two
cases. By shifting the mix of taxes and subsidies, the optimal policy is able to
achieve roughly the same outcome regardless of the value of ε∗s.
To further examine the features of the optimal policy, we present four simula-
tions that vary different elements of Home’s policy.
6.2.2 Coalition Size
A key factor in global climate negotiations is the set of countries that will agree
to emissions reductions. To examine the effects of coalition size, Figure 2 shows
global emissions under optimal policies with five increasingly large coalitions,
starting with just the EU and moving up to a global coalition.34 Tables 7, 8 and
9 provide the calibrations for the three new scenarios. We show effects for our
baseline calibration of ε∗s (left panel) and our alternative calibration (right panel).
All other parameters remain the same across each case.
Figure 2 can be thought of as a production possibility frontier showing the
trade-offs between emissions reductions and cost for a given pricing coalition. Cost
is measured as the reduced consumption needed to achieve a given percentage
reduction in emissions from the 2015 level (32.3 Gt CO2).35 The x’s in each line
show the optimal emissions reduction when ϕW = 2.
Both panels show a consistent story, which is that there are substantial gains
from expanding the taxing coalition. The EU alone has almost no power to reduce
34We treat the global case as the limit of our two-region model as Foreign becomes infinitesi-
mally small. For the EU-only case, we treat the EU as having 28 members as it had, prior to
Brexit, in 2015.
35Our measure of economic cost of the policy to Home starts with the welfare measure W
given above, but adds ϕW
(
QWe (pe, tb, te)−QWe
)
(which is negative) to the numerator. The
result is necessarily a negative number, becoming more negative as a larger ϕW leads to greater
emissions reductions. This measure is convenient to compute, but implicitly assumes ϕ∗ = 0.
If ϕ∗ > 0 then we overstate the economic cost to Home by ignoring transfers from Foreign to
Home that offset gains to Foreign from reduced global emissions. Given a non-zero value for
ϕ∗ it is straightforward to make the necessary adjustment, which would push our measure of
economic cost toward zero.
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Figure 2: Choice of Pricing Coalition
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Table 7: Calibration for the European Union
Home Foreign Total
Home CHHe = 3.0 CHFe = 1.0 Ce = 4.0
Foreign CFHe = 0.5 CFFe = 27.8 C∗e = 28.3
Total Ge = 3.5 G∗e = 28.8 GWe = CWe = 32.3
Extraction Qe = 1.0 Q∗e =31.3 QWe = 32.3
emissions. Adding the United States or the rest of the OECD countries helps
significantly and increases the willingness of the coalition to incur costs to reduce
emissions. Adding China to the taxing coalition leads to even greater emissions
reductions for any given consumption cost.
Looking at the calibration tables, we can see that the size of the extraction
base is the key difference between the EU and the coalition of the EU and the
United States. Production and consumption roughly double, reflecting the relative
size of the two economies, but extraction goes up by a factor of more than 5. With
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Table 8: Calibration for the EU and the United States
Home Foreign Total
Home CHHe = 7.7 CHFe = 2.0 Ce = 9.8
Foreign CFHe = 0.7 CFFe = 21.8 C∗e = 22.5
Total Ge = 8.5 G∗e = 23.8 GWe = CWe = 32.3
Extraction Qe = 5.4 Q∗e =26.9 QWe = 32.3
Table 9: Calibration for the OECD plus China
Home Foreign Total
Home CHHe = 20.1 CHFe = 1.7 Ce = 21.8
Foreign CFHe = 1.4 CFFe = 9.1 C∗e = 10.5
Total Ge = 21.5 G∗e = 10.8 GWe = CWe = 32.3
Extraction Qe = 16.24 Q∗e =16.1 QWe = 32.3
almost no extraction, the EU on its own gets little advantage from the extraction
tax portion of the optimal policy, which means that acting alone, it is ineffective
at reducing global emissions. Adding the United States expands the extraction
base and makes the policy more effective.
Comparing the left and right panels, we can see that regardless of the value
of ε∗s, the taxing coalition is able to achieve about the same emissions reductions
for a given cost. With the exception of the EU-only tax, however, the taxing
coalition is willing to incur a higher cost when ε∗s is low than when it is high. For
example, the OECD would choose to reduce emissions by 24.6% at a cost of 9%
when ε∗s = 0.5, but would only be willing to spend 6.2% to reduce emissions by
22% when ε∗s = 2.0.
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6.2.3 Choice of Tax
The top panels of Figure 3 compares the optimal tax to the six constrained optimal
taxes, under our baseline calibration and for ε∗S = 2.0.36 The bottom panels show
the effects on pe for each tax.
Figure 3: Effects of different taxes on emissions and pe
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With a low value of ε∗S, extraction taxes perform much better than the demand-
side taxes (production or consumption taxes, or a hybrid of the two). The bottom
panel illustrates why: the extraction tax raises pe while the demand-side taxes
36We leave out the extraction/production/consumption hybrid as it turns out to be indistin-
guishable from the unilaterally optimal policy in this figure. Some of the lines in Figure 3 stop
short of a cost of 10%. This is for two reasons. First, we only ran our simulation up to values
of ϕW = 20. Second, Home extraction goes to zero for sufficiently high values of ϕW , so an
extraction tax become ineffective beyond that point.
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lower it. Increasing pe in this case induces a demand-side response in Foreign
without generating a large supply-side response. In fact, when ε∗s is low, both
hybrids involving an extraction tax perform almost as well as the optimal tax.
When ε∗S = 2.0 (the right hand panel) extraction taxes are no longer as
desirable. Increasing pe would cause a substantial increase in Foreign extraction,
offsetting the effectiveness of the tax. Demand-side taxes are correspondingly more
effective because lowering pe causes a significant reduction in Foreign extraction.
For example, the basic production tax goes from an optimal emissions reduction
of 4.8% when ε∗s = 0.5 to reductions of 10.6% when ε∗s = 2.0. Looking at the
bottom right panel, we can see that Home is less willing to allow pe to change
when ε∗s is high.
6.2.4 Location
Figure 4: Effects on Foreign Activities

























































Figure 4 explores the effects of taxes on leakage and other shifts in location,
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focusing on how activities in Foreign change in response to Home’s taxes. It
illustrates the optimal tax and four of the constrained taxes (dropping the basic
consumption and extraction/consumption hybrid to reduce clutter). It shows
the percent changes in Q∗e, G∗e, and C∗e relative to their values with no tax. The
bottom right panel shows the change in global emissions that the OECD would
choose if it were constrained to using each of these taxes.
Changes to extraction (top left) are consistent with the changes to pe seen in
Figure 3. Extraction taxes drive up pe and as a result, cause Foreign to increase
its extraction. Production and consumption taxes drive pe down, causing Foreign
to reduce its extraction. The optimal tax and the extraction/production hybrid
moderate the effects on Foreign extraction.
The opposite occurs for G∗e and C∗e (top right, bottom left). Because production
and consumption taxes drive pe down, G∗e and C∗e both go up when Home imposes
those taxes. Correspondingly, Foreign production and consumption both go down
when Home imposes an extraction tax. And once again, the optimal and the
extraction/production hybrid operate in the middle.
7 Multiple Energy Sources
Up to this point we have assumed that all energy is from fossil fuel with a fixed
carbon content. We could therefore normalize a unit of CO2 to be a unit of
energy, treating energy and CO2 interchangeably. We also assumed that energy
is costlessly traded, crude oil being the closest example. Here we explore how
our analysis can accommodate a variety of energy sources, with only oil being
tradable.
We introduce K ≥ 1 sources, indexed by k, such as coal, natural gas, and
solar. We assume that these sources are perfect substitutes in providing energy,
but may differ in their CO2 content (per unit of energy), hk. We take k = 1 to be
crude oil, and normalize h1 = 1. If k is a renewable source, hk = 0. Each source
has a corresponding distribution of energy fields, Ek(a) in Home and E∗k(a) in
Foreign.37 This formulation, in terms of energy fields, can describe renewable
37We assume these functions satisfy the conditions described in footnote 7.
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sources as well since costs of generating solar, wind, and water power are also
dictated by scarce geographic factors.
We assume that the world energy market is integrated through trade in oil,
while other sources of energy can’t be shipped. This assumption rules out potential
policy interventions by Home to shift Foreign supply toward sources with lower
CO2 content.38 These assumptions lead to a simple generalization of our analysis


























Setting K = 1 we return to the basic model used above in Sections 2-5.
7.1 Amendments to the Planner’s Problem
This extension requires only modest amendments to the planner’s problem. The
inner problem is unchanged since different sources of energy are perfect substitutes
in production. The outer problem must be modified to accommodate the planner’s
38For example, if renewables were tradable at a low cost, Home might import them while also
exporting them in order to limit Foreign’s extraction of fossil fuels. While intriguing, we chose
to postpone a careful analysis of such policies.
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choice of extraction from each source, {Qe,k}Kk=1, and to determine how its choice
of pe depends on Foreign’s energy sources.






+ λe ≤ 0,
with equality if Qe,k > 0. The extra labor in Home to extract a bit more energy







for λe − hkϕW ≥ 0 and Qe,k = 0 otherwise.
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This condition is identical to (19) except that there is now a separate extraction
wedge, λe−hkϕW−pe, for each energy source. The wedge is equal to the difference
between the planner’s marginal valuation of extracting energy from a given source
and the price of energy.
In its simplified form, the condition is similar to (20):
λe − pe =
ϕW ε̃∗SQ
∗









The new ingredients are two separate elasticities of Foreign extraction: ε∗S for
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where ε∗S,k = peE∗′k (pe)/E∗k(pe). The key insight is that these two elasticities
capture all that is relevant about Foreign energy supply in formulating the
optimal unilateral policy.
7.2 Amendments to Optimal Taxes
The optimal policy can still be implemented with an extraction tax, a border
adjustment, and a subsidy to Home’s marginal exporters. We can no longer treat
energy and CO2 as functionally the same, however. If the nominal extraction tax
is applied to the carbon content of each type of energy, the rate per unit of CO2
would still be equal to the Pigouvian wedge, ϕW . But, the nominal tax per unit
of energy extracted from source k is tNe,k = hkϕW .
The level of the border adjustment is tb = λe− pe, per unit of energy, given by
equation (23). This result formalizes the argument made in Kortum and Weisbach
(2017) that the border adjustment should not be based on the carbon content of
the energy source used to produce individual goods. Instead, what matters is the
carbon content of the marginal energy source of the country exporting the good,
as captured by ε∗S and ε̃∗S in (23). The price faced by users of energy is pe + tb,
without regard to the source.
The final element of Home’s carbon policy, the subsidy to Home’s marginal
exporters, is unchanged by the addition of multiple energy sources.
Putting the nominal extraction tax and border adjustment together, the
effective extraction tax on energy from source k is te,k = tNe,k − tb, equal to (minus)
the associated extraction wedge. Extraction from source k by Home is thus:
Qe,k = Ek (pe − te,k) = Ek
(
pe + tb − tNe,k
)
,
for pe − te,k > 0 and Qe,k = 0 otherwise. Extraction from a high-carbon source k
may be shut down under the optimal policy. Extraction from low-carbon sources
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will be stimulated relative to high-carbon sources.
8 Conclusion
While the model in this paper is highly stylized, its simplicity yields analytical
insights into the features of an optimal unilateral carbon policy.
To see which features are of first-order importance, it is critical to push the
analysis in a more quantitative direction, extending it to multiple countries and
perhaps to multiple periods of time as well. For the first extension, the multi-
country model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) retains the Ricardian structure of
trade in goods used here, while the model of Larch and Wanner (2019) contains a
natural multi-country extension of the energy sector. On the second extension,
Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2014) and Kotlikoff, Kubler, Polbin,
Sachs, and Scheidegger (2021) provide roadmaps for introducing dynamics.
Another important extension, in a multi-country world, is to consider endoge-
nizing the region we call Home. Our current approach follows Markusen (1975)
and CDVW in assuming that Foreign is intransigent. Home’s optimal policy will
likely be different if it can entice (or coerce) Foreign countries to join its coalition.
Such policies are studied by Nordhaus (2015), while Farrokhi and Lashkaripour
(2020) have made advances in solving them in more realistic settings.
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A Global Planner’s Problem
Suppose the planner controls all decisions in Foreign as well as in Home. We
pointed out in the paper that we can solve this problem with the same Lagrangian
(12), simply enlarging the set of choice variables. (We remove the choice of pe
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The global planner chooses Qe, Q∗e, {yj}, {y∗j}, {xj}, {mj}, {z
y
j }, {z∗j }, {zxj }, and
{zmj } to maximize L.
A.1 Solution
Following CDVW, we first solve the inner problem, involving conditions for an
individual good j, given λe. We then turn to the outer problem, optimizing over
Qe and Q∗e while solving for λe.
A.1.1 Inner Problem
The inner problem amounts to a Lagrangian for good j (as in the paper):
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We maximize it by choosing: yj, y∗j , xj, mj, z
y
j , z∗j , zxj , and zmj .












The unit energy requirement in Home is thus:
ej(z) = (1− α)ajλ−αe ,
while in Foreign:
e∗j(z) = (1− α)a∗jλ−αe .
The FOC for yj implies:
u′(yj +mj) ≤ ajλ1−αe ,
with equality if yj > 0. The FOC for mj implies:
u′(yj +mj) ≤ a∗jτ ∗λ1−αe ,
with equality if mj > 0. The good j̄m at which the FOC’s for yj and mj both


















and yj = 0.
The FOC for y∗j implies:
u∗′(y∗j + xj) ≤ a∗jλ1−αe ,
with equality if y∗j > 0. The FOC for xj implies:
u∗′(y∗j + xj) ≤ ajτλ1−αe ,
with equality if xj > 0. The good j̄x at which the FOC’s for y∗j and xj both hold
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satisfies:
F (j̄x) = τ.
Since F is monotonically decreasing, it follows that j̄x < j̄m. For j < j̄x:
xj = η
∗ (ajτλ1−αe )−σ∗
and y∗j = 0 while for j > j̄x:
y∗j = η
∗ (a∗jλ1−αe )−σ∗
and xj = 0.
Aggregating over goods, the implicit consumption of energy in Home is:
Ce(λe) = (1− α) η
(∫ j̄m
0










which is a function of the Lagrange multiplier λe. Similarly, in Foreign:




















In the outer problem we choose Qe and Q∗e while solving for the value of λe that
clears the global energy market. We can rewrite the outer Lagrangian in terms of
aggregate magnitudes as:









− λe (Ce + C∗e −Qe −Q∗e) .
The first order condition with respect to Home energy extraction implies:
Qe = E(λe − ϕW ),
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for λe − ϕW ≥ 0, or else Qe = 0. Likewise for Foreign energy extraction:
Q∗e = E
∗(λe − ϕW ),
for λe − ϕW ≥ 0, or else Q∗e = 0. The Lagrange multiplier solves:
Ce(λe) + C
∗









A.2 Decentralized Global Optimum
We can interpret the solution in terms of a decentralized economy with a price of
energy:
pe = λe.
An extraction tax in both countries, equal to global marginal damages from





In this case the nominal and effective tax are the same. Energy extractors in
both countries receive an after-tax price of pe − ϕW . With a globally harmonized
policy, a consumption tax at rate ϕW results in the same outcomes.39
A.3 Competitive Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium agents ignore the global externality. All outcomes
other than global welfare are the same as if we simply set ϕW = 0 in the
decentralized global optimum above, and hence λe = pe. For later reference,
we list the outcomes for any good j in Table 10. We treat this case as our
business-as-usual (BAU) baseline.
39Inspection of the global market clearing condition for energy shows that extraction and
consumption of energy remain the same if we instead set pe = λe+ϕW . This change corresponds
to adding full border adjustments, tb = t∗b = ϕ
W , to a nominal extraction tax, tNe = tN∗e = ϕW ,
turning it into a consumption tax. Any differences in the distribution of services consumption
between these two policies (a global extraction tax versus a global consumption tax) can be
addressed with transfers.
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Table 10: BAU Competitive Equilibrium (Good-j Outcomes)
Home Foreign
Home yj = η (ajp1−αe )
−σ







Foreign xj = η∗ (τajp1−αe )
−σ∗
j < j̄x y
∗
j = η
∗ (a∗jp1−αe )−σ∗ j > j̄x
Thresholds: F (j̄m) = 1/τ∗ and F (j̄x) = τ
B Home Planner’s Problem: Additional Details
Here we provide missing steps from Section 3 of the text, which derives the optimal
unilateral policy.
B.1 The Energy-Price Condition































where we have introduced:








We now turn to the partial derivatives (with respect to the energy price) of the
seven aggregate variables that appear in (24): Q∗e, L∗e, G∗e, Ge, Lg, L∗g, and V ∗g .
While we don’t make it explicit in our notation that follows, all of these partial
derivatives are evaluated at the optimal unilateral policy itself.
B.1.1 Dependence on the Energy Price
Foreign energy extraction depends directly on the energy price via (6), with













Dependence on the energy price is more subtle for the other five aggregates.
Since Home directly chooses z, j̄m, j̄x, {mj}, and {yj}, the envelope theorem
allows us treat them as fixed when differentiating the Lagrangian with respect
to pe. From the inner problem, each satisfies its own first-order condition with
equality.40 Furthermore, we can take as fixed the unit energy requirement for





and z∗ are not chosen by the planner while for j ∈ (j0, j̄x] the export
levels {xj} are optimized at a corner solution. They must be considered in the
first order condition. We apply (7) and results in the bottom half of Table 2 to
compute the partial derivatives of the five aggregates.










depends on the energy price only through the first integral, CFFe . The partial










That is, a change in the energy price affects Foreign’s use of energy only through
its domestic consumption CFFe and not through its exports of goods to Home
CHFe . Home has chosen and optimized the determinants of CHFe (j̄m, mj, and
zm = z).











∗ (a∗jp1−αe )−σ∗ dj,
depends on the energy price only through the third term (while j0 also depends on
the energy price, its derivative adds to the second term exactly what it subtracts
40Thus, Cg in (17) does not appear in (24) since it depends only on terms that were optimized
in the inner problem.
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from the third term). The partial derivative we seek is therefore:
∂Ge
∂pe







































Since only the first term depends on the price of energy:
∂L∗g
∂pe
= α(1− σ∗)CFFe . (29)
The new term, V ∗g , can be written as:
























Since only the last two integrals depend on the energy price, the derivative is:
∂V ∗g
∂pe




p∗jxjdj + (1− σ∗)CFFe . (30)
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B.1.2 Restatement of the Optimality Condition
Using the partial derivatives from above, we can simplify the first order condition
















































































































Applying equation (26) and rearranging, we obtain:
(
(λe − ϕW )− pe
) ∂Q∗e
∂pe













which is (19) in the text.
B.2 Bounds on the Consumption Wedge
We establish a lower bound on λe − pe by decomposing the wedges (or subsidies)
sj, for j ∈ (j0, j̄x), which enter (20) through S. Adding and subtracting λee∗j(z∗)
from each wedge:
sj = (λe − pe)e∗j(z∗)− πj,
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where πj = l∗j (z∗)+λee∗j(z∗)−τajλ1−αe > 0 is the planner’s value of global resources
saved when a unit of good j is produced in Home and exported rather than being
produced in Foreign. Equation (15) shows that πj is also the derivative of the
inner problem with respect to xj, so is strictly positive for j < j̄x and zero at
j = j̄x.
Substituting this expression for sj into the overall implicit subsidy S, we can
rewrite (20) as:




















The denominator is strictly positive while the numerator is weakly positive,
establishing the result that λe − pe ≥ 0. If ϕW ε∗SQ∗e = 0 then λe − pe = 0, with
j0 = j̄x.
Having shown that λe ≥ pe, it follows that j0 ≤ j̄x and hence S > 0. We get
an upper bound on λe by using (20) to write:





















The right-hand side is positive, which implies λe−pe ≤ ϕW , with a strict inequality
if ϕW > 0.
C Constrained-Optimal Policies
Here we derive the formulas for the constrained-optimal policies that appear
in Tables 3-4 of the paper. As in the paper, we first consider extraction and
consumption taxes before turning to the more intricate derivations for policies
that involve a production tax.
C.1 Basic Extraction Policy
We constrain the planner to choose only Qe and pe. Energy intensities, quantities
produced, and quantities consumed of each good j are as in the BAU competitive
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V ∗g − ϕW (Qe +Q∗e)





where Vg = u′(Cg) ·Cg and V ∗g = u∗′(C∗g ) ·C∗g . All terms but the first are the same
as in (17). This first term Vg depends on Cg, which is no longer optimized within
the inner problem.
C.1.1 Solution
The first order condition for Qe is identical to that for the unilaterally optimal
policy. For λe − ϕW ≥ 0:
Qe = E(λe − ϕW ),
otherwise Qe = 0.





















































(1− α) (1− σ)
pe
Vg = (1− σ)Ce.






























= α(1− σ)Ce + α(1− σ∗)C∗e .
Finally, we still have ∂L∗e/∂pe = pe∂Q∗e/∂pe.
Plugging in these partial derivatives, and using εD = σ + (1− σ)α (similarly

















































In a market economy we can impose an extraction tax of te = ϕW − (λe − pe) so
that the after-tax price, pe− te = λe−ϕW , induces the optimal level of extraction















C.2 Basic Consumption Policy








, {yj}, {mj}, and pe.
C.2.1 Solution
We first consider the inner problem (conditions for an individual good j given
values for pe and λe) then return to the outer problem (optimizing pe and solving
for λe).
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Table 11: Basic Consumption Policy (Good-j Outcomes)
Home Foreign
Home yj = η (ajλ1−αe )
−σ







Foreign xj = η∗ (τajp1−αe )
−σ∗
j < j̄x y
∗
j = η
∗ (a∗jp1−αe )−σ∗ j > j̄x
Thresholds: F (j̄m) = 1/τ∗ and F (j̄x) = τ
Inner Problem The terms involving Foreign consumption drop out of the inner
problem, as they are determined by pe, leaving:










The first order conditions for zyj , zmj , yj , and ymj will clearly be identical to those for
the unilaterally optimal policy. The results, together with the market-determined
outcomes, are summarized in Table 11.
All producers serving consumers in Home, whether domestic or foreign, use
the same energy intensity, but Home uses a different energy intensity for serving
consumers in Home and Foreign (unlike in the unilaterally optimal case). The
import and export thresholds are the same as in the BAU competitive equilibrium.
Outer Problem As in the unilaterally optimal problem, we can treat Cg and
Ce as constants in the outer problem since they are fully determined by the inner
problem. Unlike the unilaterally optimal problem, we can also treat the energy
sector as being globally integrated, since in the basic consumption policy Qe is
determined by the global energy price as in the BAU competitive equilibrium.











We maximize this expression with respect to pe.
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Like the basic extraction case, consumption in Foreign is determined as:

























V ∗g = (1− σ∗)C∗e .
Labor used in goods production is affected by the energy price through Foreign






= α(1− σ∗)C∗e .
Finally, we have ∂LWe /∂pe = pe∂QWe /∂pe.
Substituting these results into the first order condition while adding pe∂C∗e/∂pe =















− ε∗DC∗e + α(1− σ∗)C∗e .
All the terms on the right-hand side involving C∗e cancel out so that we can rewrite
this condition as:













In a market economy we can impose a consumption tax of tc = λe − pe so that
the after-tax price of energy embodied in goods consumed in Home, pe + tc = λe,
















C.3 Extraction-Consumption Hybrid Policy
We now augment the basic consumption policy by allowing the planner to choose
the amount of energy extraction in Home. To solve this problem we need only
tweak the basic consumption case by replacing the competitively determined Qe
with the optimally chosen value.
C.3.1 Solution
The inner problem is identical to the optimal basic consumption policy. The outer





V ∗g − ϕW (Qe +Q∗e)− Le − L∗e − LWg − λe (Ce + C∗e −Qe −Q∗e) .
We solve the Lagrangian by maximizing this expression with respect to Qe and pe.
The first order condition for Qe delivers the same result as for the optimal
basic extraction (and unilaterally optimal) policy. For λe − ϕW ≥ 0:
Qe = E(λe − ϕW ),
otherwise Qe = 0.




























We can simplify it just like for the basic consumption case, but now using
∂L∗e/∂pe = pe∂Q
∗















− ε∗DC∗e + α(1− σ∗)C∗e .
Canceling out the C∗e terms and rearranging yields:














In a market economy, the optimal consumption tax is:












Since the optimal nominal extraction tax is tNe = ϕW (as in the unilaterally
optimal policy) the corresponding effective extraction tax is te = ϕW − (λe − pe).
C.4 Basic Production Policy
We constrain the planner to choose pe and the relative price of energy for Home
producers, re. Goods prices are thus: p∗j = a∗jp1−αe and pj = aj(repe)1−α with
pmj = τ
∗p∗j and pxj = τpj.
We get the export margin by equating pxj with p∗j at j = j̄x:
F (j̄x) = τr
1−α
e .












while xj = 0.












Table 12: Basic Production Policy (Good-j Outcomes)
Home Foreign
Home yj = η (aj(repe)1−α)
−σ







Foreign xj = η∗ (τaj(repe)1−α)
−σ∗
j < j̄x y
∗
j = η
∗ (a∗jp1−αe )−σ∗ j > j̄x
Thresholds: F (j̄m) = (1/τ∗)r1−αe and F (j̄x) = τr1−αe
while yj = 0. For any good j < j̄m Home purchases:
yj = η(aj(repe)
1−α)−σ
from local producers, while mj = 0.
Table 12 summarizes these results. The intensive margin of demand for goods
produced in Home depends on repe, the intensive margin for goods produced in
Foreign depends only on pe, and the extensive margins of trade depend only on re.
C.4.1 Aggregates and Derivatives
We can compute aggregates that depend on re and pe. A term that arises
repeatedly in differentiating these aggregates with respect to re is the energy
Home uses to produce a good at the import threshold:





and at the export threshold:







The following list reports the key aggregates and their derivatives:



















































(The last equality applies the expression for the import threshold.)







































= (1− σ)peCHHe .



























































(The last equality applies the expression for the export threshold.)






























= (1− σ∗)peCFHe .
7. Labor employed globally in goods production:


















= α(1− σ)peCHHe + α(1− σ∗)peCFHe .



























































10. Energy used globally to produce goods:
CWe = Ge +G
∗



























































The last set of results can be combined into a production leakage term, Λ.
Due to a rise in re, the ratio of the increase in Foreign use of energy relative to









































We maximize it over re and pe.












































































+ εD(re − 1)CHHe + ε∗D(re − 1)CFHe ,
from which we can derive the expression in the paper:
(
(λe − ϕW )− pe
) ∂QWe
∂pe
= (λe − repe)
∂Ge
∂pe































e + α(1− σ)peCHHe + α(1− σ∗)peCFHe .















































The optimal re balances the two wedges on the right hand side of (32).




Substituting into (32) yields:
λe − pe = ϕW
∂QWe /∂pe













Since Λ ≥ 0 it’s clear that λe ≥ pe and hence λe ≥ repe as well.
C.4.3 Decentralization
In a market economy we can impose a production tax of tp = repe− pe so that the
after-tax price of energy used to produce goods in Home, pe + tp = repe, induces
the optimal energy intensity. The production tax rate is thus:










In the case of no trade in goods there is no leakage and the basic production tax
becomes the same as the basic consumption tax.
C.5 Extraction-Production Hybrid Policy
Suppose we augment the basic production policy by allowing the planner to choose










V ∗g − ϕW (Qe +Q∗e)





We want to maximize this Lagrangian over Qe, re, and pe.
The first order condition for Qe is identical to that for the unilaterally optimal
policy. For λe − ϕW ≥ 0:
Qe = E(λe − ϕW ),
otherwise Qe = 0.






























which is the same as the basic production policy except that ∂Q∗e/∂pe is in place
of ∂QWe /∂pe and ∂L∗e/∂pe is in place of ∂LWe /∂pe. We can thus jump to the
expression in the paper:
(
(λe − ϕW )− pe
) ∂Q∗e
∂pe
= (λe − repe)
∂Ge
∂pe









λe − pe = ϕW
∂Q∗e/∂pe














Table 13: Production-Consumption Hybrid Policy (Good-j Outcomes)
Home Foreign
Home yj = η (ajλ1−αe )
−σ







Foreign xj = η∗ (τaj(repe)1−α)
−σ∗
j < j̄x y
∗
j = η
∗ (a∗jp1−αe )−σ∗ j > j̄x
Thresholds: F (j̄m) = 1/τ∗ and F (j̄x) = τr1−αe
C.5.2 Decentralization
In a market economy, the optimal production tax rate is:










From the first order condition for Qe we know that the after-tax price received by
extractors must satisfy:
repe − tNe = pe − te = λe − ϕW .
The optimal nominal extraction tax is thus:
tNe = ϕ




while the corresponding effective extraction tax is:
te = t
N




C.6 Production-Consumption Hybrid Policy
We now augment the basic consumption policy by allowing the planner to choose
re, where repe is the cost of energy for producing Home’s exports. Since the
choice of re doesn’t interact with any of the good-specific choices under the basic
consumption policy, we simply summarize the results for a particular good j in
Table 13.
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C.6.1 Aggregates and Derivatives
Using these results we compute aggregates that depend on re and pe. A term that
arises in differentiating these aggregates with respect to re is the energy Home
uses to produce a good at the export threshold:







The following list of aggregates and derivatives is shorter than that for the basic
production case, since some of the aggregates are fully determined by the planner’s
control of Home consumption:


























































(The last equality applies the expression for the export threshold.)































= (1− σ∗)peCFHe .
4. Labor employed globally in goods production:















= α(1− σ∗)peCFHe .
(Note that Vg is invariant to pe or re.)



























































which now depends only on terms related to Home exports.
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C.6.2 Solution









We want to maximize this Lagrangian over re, and pe.































































+ ε∗D(re − 1)CFHe ,
from which we can derive the expression in the paper:
(
(λe − ϕW )− pe
) ∂QWe
∂pe
= (λe − repe)
∂CFHe
∂pe























e + α(1− σ∗)peCFHe = ε∗DpeCFHe .
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The optimal re balances the two wedges on the right hand side of (32).




Substituting into (32) yields:
λe − pe = ϕW
∂QWe /∂pe

















Since Λ ≥ 0 it’s clear that λe ≥ pe and hence λe ≥ repe as well.
C.6.3 Decentralization
In a market economy the optimal consumption tax is:
















The optimal production tax on Home’s exports is:
tp = repe − pe = (λe − pe)− (λe − repe) = (1− Λ)tc.
C.7 Extraction-Production-Consumption Hybrid Policy
The final case augments the production-consumption policy to allow the planner
to choose Qe. Many of the results for the production-consumption case carry over,
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including those for individual goods shown in Table 13 as well as aggregates and
derivatives derived in Section C.6.1.
C.7.1 Solution









except we now we maximize this Lagrangian over Qe, re, and pe.
The first order condition for Qe is identical to that for the unilaterally optimal
policy. For λe − ϕW ≥ 0:
Qe = E(λe − ϕW ),
otherwise Qe = 0. The first order condition for pe is only slightly revised from the

























We can thus jump to the expression in the paper:
(
(λe − ϕW )− pe
) ∂Q∗e
∂pe
= (λe − repe)
∂CFHe
∂pe



























Combining terms, we have:
λe − pe = ϕW
∂Q∗e/∂pe


















In a market economy the optimal nominal extraction tax is tNe = ϕW , while the
effective rate is:
te = ϕ




















The optimal consumption tax, applying to Home consumption of both domestically
produced and imported goods is:
















The optimal production tax on Home exports of goods is:
tp = repe − pe = (λe − pe)− (λe − repe) = (1− Λ)tc.
D Solutions for Quantitative Illustration
Here we provide a list of equations for the parameterized version of the model that
we use for the quantitative results in Section 6 of the paper. For each outcome,
we start with the BAU competitive equilibrium value that we calibrate the model
to. We then show how to express the optimal outcomes in terms of these BAU
outcomes. To distinguished the two, we express outcomes under the optimal policy
as functions of pe and tb (since tNe = ϕW under the policy we don’t need to include
it in the notation). We eliminate these arguments to represent BAU outcomes.
Thus for an outcome x we denote the optimal outcome as x(pe, tb) (sometimes x′
for short) and the BAU outcome as simply x. We impose the restrictions from
Section 6.1.1. .
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D.1 Expressions to Compute the Optimal Policy
Most of the expressions that follow are based on integrating energy use across
the continuum of goods. We start with the three expressions for unit energy
requirements per good under the optimal policy:
1. For production in Home to serve consumers in Home or Foreign
ej(z) = (1− α)aj(pe + tb)−α
2. For production in Foreign to serve consumers in Home
e∗j(z) = (1− α)a∗j(pe + tb)−α
3. For production in Foreign to serve consumers in Foreign
e∗j(z
∗) = (1− α)a∗jp−αe
These three expressions apply to BAU as well by setting pe = 1 and tb = 0.
We now express each of the unilaterally optimal outcomes in terms of pe,
tb, and calibrated to the corresponding outcomes under the BAU competitive
equilibrium.
1. The import margin is invariant to the optimal policy:
j̄′m = j̄m(pe, tb) = j̄m =
A





(a) Under unilateral optimal:
j̄x(pe, tb) =
τ−θAp−αθe (pe + tb)
−(1−α)θ
τ−θAp−αθe (pe + tb)













e (pe + tb)
−(1−α)θ
j̄xp−αθe (pe + tb)
−(1−α)θ + (1− j̄x) (pe + (1− α) tb)−θ
(d) Our shorthand expression is: j̄x
′
= j̄x(pe, tb).
3. Intermediate export margin:


















j0(pe + tb)−(1−α)θ + (1− j0)p−(1−α)θe
(d) Our shorthand expression is: j′0 = j0(pe, tb).
4. Energy used by producers in Home to supply Home consumers:
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(a) Under unilateral optimal:








= η (1− α) (pe + tb)−εD
A(σ−1)/θ




CHHe = η (1− α)
A(σ−1)/θ
1 + (1− σ) /θ
(j̄m)
1+(1−σ)/θ
(c) Expressed in terms of BAU:
CHHe (pe, tb) = (pe + tb)
−εD CHHe
5. Energy used by producers in Home to supply exports of Home:
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(a) Under unilateral optimal:
CFHe (pe, tb) = C
FH,1
e (pe, tb) + C
FH,2
e (pe, tb)





















1 + (1− σ∗) /θ
(j′0)
1+(1−σ∗)/θ







































1 + (1− σ∗) /θ
(j̄x)
1+(1−σ∗)/θ
41The incomplete beta function is:




for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, a > 0, and b > 0. Setting x = 1 gives the beta function itself, B(a, b).
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(c) Expressed in terms of BAU:







CFH,2e (pe, tb) = τ








































































6. Energy used by producers in Foreign to supply Foreign consumers:
(a) Under unilateral optimal:





























1 + (1− σ∗) /θ
(1− j̄x)1+(1−σ
∗)/θ
(c) Expressed in terms of BAU:








7. Energy used by producers in Foreign to supply imports of Home:
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(a) Under unilateral optimal:












= (τ ∗)1−σ η(1− α) (pe + tb)−εD
(A∗)(σ−1)/θ





∗)1−σ η(1− α) (A
∗)(σ−1)/θ
1 + (1− σ) /θ
(1− j̄m)1+(1−σ)/θ
(c) Expressed in terms of BAU:
CHFe (pe, tb) = (pe + tb)
−εD CHFe











1 + (1− σ∗) /θ
(j̄x)
1+(1−σ∗)/θ
+ η∗(1− α) (A
∗)(σ
∗−1)/θ
















1 + (1− σ∗)/θ
9. Value of Home exports of goods:
87
(a) Under unilateral optimal:
V FHg (pe, tb) = V
FH,1
g (pe, tb) + V
FH,2
g (pe, tb)
















η? (pe + tb)
1−ε?D A
−(1−σ?)/θ
1 + (1− σ?) /θ
(j′0)
1+(1−σ?)/θ




















1 + (1− σ∗) /θ(
(1− j′0)








1 + (1− σ∗) /θ
(j̄x)
1+(1−σ∗)/θ
(c) Expressed in terms of BAU:














































10. Value of Home’s imports of goods:
(a) Under unilateral optimal:

























1 + (1− σ) /θ
(1− j̄m)1+(1−σ)/θ
(b) Under BAU:
V HFg = (τ
∗)1−σ η
(A∗)(σ−1)/θ
1 + (1− σ) /θ
(1− j̄m)1+(1−σ)/θ
(c) Expressed in terms of BAU:
V HFg (pe, tb) = (pe + tb)
−εD (pe + αtb)V
HF
g





V HFg (pe, tb) = (pe + tb)




11. Energy extraction by Home:
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(a) Under unilateral optimal (for pe + tb − ϕW ≥ 0):
Qe(pe, tb) =
(




(c) Expressed in terms of BAU:
Qe(pe, tb) =
(
pe + tb − ϕW
)εS Qe
(d) If pe + tb − ϕW ≤ 0 then Qe(pe, tb) = 0
12. Energy extraction by Foreign:
(a) Under unilateral optimal:





(c) Expressed in terms of BAU:
Q∗e(pe, tb) = (pe)
ε∗SQ∗e
13. Total export subsidy:















= (pe + tb)
CFH,2e (pe, tb)
1− α
− V FH,2g (pe, tb)
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(b) Under BAU: S = 0
14. Maximum export subsidy relative to production cost:
(a) Under unilateral optimal:
sj̄′x





τaj̄′x (pe + tb)
1−α









(b) Under BAU: sj̄′x = 0
D.2 Expressions to Compute Welfare
Having solved for the optimal border adjustment and the corresponding change
in the global energy price we can compute all other outcomes as well. A key
outcome is Home’s welfare in moving to the optimal unilateral policy from the
BAU competitive equilibrium.



















V ∗g − ϕWQWe − LWg − LWe







V ∗g (pe, tb)−ϕWQWe (pe, tb)−LWg (pe, tb)−LWe (pe, tb)
3. The change in moving to the optimal unilateral policy from the BAU
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competitive equilibrium:
U(pe, tb)− U =
σ
σ − 1
(Vg(pe, tb)− Vg) +
σ∗
σ∗ − 1
(V ∗g (pe, tb)− V ∗g )
− ϕW (QWe (pe, tb)−QWe )− (LWg (pe, tb)− LWg )− (LWe (pe, tb)− LWe )




For the terms in the welfare function above, we show:
1. Home’s employment in energy extraction:
(a) Change from BAU to unilateral optimal (for pe + tb − ϕW ≥ 0)::












((pe + tb − ϕW )εS+1 − 1)Qe
(b) If pe + tb − ϕW ≤ 0 then Le(pe, tb) = 0
2. Foreign’s employment in energy extraction:
(a) Change from BAU to unilateral optimal:

















3. Labor employed in production in Home:
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− CHHe − CFHe
)
4. Labor employed in production in Foreign:



























e (pe, tb)− CHFe + peCFFe (pe, tb)− CHFe
)
5. The value of Home’s spending on goods:
(a) Under unilateral optimal:





(pe + tb) (C
HH
e (pe, tb) + C
HF
e (pe, tb))
= η (pe + tb)
1−εD
(
A+ (τ ∗)−θ A∗
)(σ−1)/θ





A+ (τ ∗)−θ A∗
)(σ−1)/θ





(c) Expressed in terms of BAU:
Vg(pe, tb) = (pe + tb)




6. The term that enters the change in Home’s welfare is:
σ
σ − 1













Vg = −(1− α) ln(pe + tb)Vg = − ln(pe + tb)Ce
7. The value of Foreign’s spending on goods:
(a) Under unilateral optimal:















1 + (1− σ∗)/θ
(b) Under BAU:











(c) Expressed in terms of BAU:















8. The term that enters the change in Foreign’s welfare is:
σ∗
σ∗ − 1




























(a) Under unilateral optimal:




QWe = Qe +Q
∗
e
D.3 Expressions for Constrained-Optimal Policies
Many of the expressions needed for the constrained optimal policies are closely
related to those for the unilateral optimal policy listed above. For policies involving




(a) For policies not involving a production tax: j̄′x = j̄x.
(b) For policies involving a production tax:





















e + 1− j̄x
2. Import margin:
(a) For policies not involving a production tax: j̄′m = j̄m.
(b) For policies involving a productin tax:





















e + 1− j̄m
3. Energy used by producers in Home to supply exports of Home:
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(a) For policies involving a production tax:




























1 + (1− σ∗) /θ
(j̄x)
1+(1−σ∗)/θ
(c) Expressed in terms of BAU:







4. Value of Home exports of goods:
(a) For policies involving a production tax:































(c) Expressed in terms of BAU:

















5. Production leakage for policies involving a production tax:




















(b) Energy Home uses to produce a good at the import threshold:
e ¯jm′y ¯jm′ = (1−α)η (repe)





























E Data and Calibration
E.1 Calibration
For our quantitative analysis we calibrate the model to fossil fuel extraction
and the energy embodied in trade between the region that, in our model, will
enact a carbon policy (Home) and the region that will remain with business as
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usual (Foreign). Our common unit for energy is gigatonnes of CO2, based on the
quantity released by its combustion.
We consider three scenarios for the regions representing Home and Foreign.
In the first, the United States is Home and all other countries are Foreign. The
alternative scenarios, respectively, are the European Union prior to Brexit (EU28)
as Home (and all other countries as Foreign) and the members of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD37) as Home (and all others
as Foreign).
Our data source for energy consumption is The Trade in Embodied CO2
(TECO2) database from OECD. We use their measure of consumption-based
CO2 emissions embodied in domestic final demand and the country of origin
of emissions. This database covers 83 countries and regional groups over the
period 2005-2015. Carbon dioxide embodied in world consumption in 2015 is
32.78 gigatonnes. We cross-checked the results with a dataset from the Global
Carbon Project. The overall difference is less than ten percent.
Extraction data are from the International Energy Agency (IEA), which
provides the World Energy Statistics Database on energy supply from all energy
sources, including fossil fuels, biofuels, hydro, geothermal, renewables and waste.
This dataset covers 143 countries as well as regional and world totals. The data
are provided in units of kilotonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe). In order to keep the
units consistent with the energy consumption data (gigatonnes of carbon dioxide),
we first convert to terajoules (TJ) (1 ktoe = 41.868 TJ) and then apply emission
factors to the five fossil fuel types to calculate CO2 emissions. The five fossil fuel
types considered are coal and coal products, natural gas, peat and peat products,
oil products, as well as crude, NGL and feedstocks. The emission factors are
default emission factors for stationary combustion from the 2006 IPCC Guidelines
for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. To be specific, we convert 1 TJ of crude,
NGL and feedstocks to 73,300 kg CO2, 1 TJ of natural gas to 56, 100 kg CO2,
and 1 TJ of coal, peat and oil products to 94, 600 kg CO2. Using this calculation,
world extraction is 35.96 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide.
To explain the discrepancy between world consumption and world extraction,
note that the OECD data for embodied carbon does not include non-energy use
of fossil fuels. In other words, some fossil fuels extracted are not combusted to
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produce energy. Instead, they are consumed directly or as intermediate goods.
For example, petroleum can be used as asphalt and road oil and as petrochemical
feedstocks for agricultural land. However, given that combusted energy is the
source of CO2 emissions, non-energy use of fossil fuel extraction is excluded in
our analysis.
To make this adjustment, we note that, according to EIA (2018), approximately
8 percent of fossil fuels are not combusted in the United States. Applying
this rate to the world extraction, we get a number close to world consumption
(35.96∗0.92 = 33.08, vs. 32.78). Thus, we can simply re-scale the world extraction
data so that world extraction is equal to world consumption. To be specific, the
original extraction data is divided by 1.097 (the ratio of world extraction to world
consumption). Tables 5, 7, 8, and 9 display the resulting data we use for our
calibration.
E.2 Parameter Values
For the key parameter in the goods production function α, the output elasticity
of labor, we calibrate (1− α)/α to the value of energy used in production peGe
relative to the value added.42 The data from TECO2 records the carbon emissions
embodied by sector and country. We can convert to barrels of oil based on 0.43
metric tons of CO2 per barrel of crude oil (from EPA, 2019). The price per barrel
of oil is taken from the average closing price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI)
crude oil in 2015, which is $48.66 per barrel. Value added data comes from OECD
Input-Output Tables (2018). We consider three definitions of the goods sector,
with both the numerator (value of energy) and the denominator (value added)
computed for the same sector definition, either: (i) the manufacturing sector,
(ii) manufacturing plus agriculture and construction, and (iii) manufacturing,
agriculture, construction, wholesale, retail, and transportation. The values of α
that we obtain are, respectively, 0.85, 0.79, and 0.84. Our preferred value is 0.85,
very close to two of these three.
For the energy supply elasticities, εS and ε∗S, we use data from Asker, Collard-
42We think of value added as the closest proxy to labor cost in the model, since we interpret
labor in the model as labor equipped with capital.
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Wexler, and De Loecker (2018) on the distribution across oil fields of extraction
costs. The data come in the form of quantiles (q = 0.05, 0.10, ..., 0.95), separately
for the EU, the US, OPEC, and ROW (q% of oil in the US is extracted at a
cost below $a per barrel, for example). We approximate OECD countries by
aggregating the EU and US while for the non-OECD region we aggregate OPEC
and ROW. To aggregate the quantiles for two regions, we combine them, sort the
combination by the cost level, and reassemble after taking account of total oil
extraction for each region (available from the IEA). The data are plotted on log
scales in Figures 5 and 6, to reveal the supply elasticity as the slope.
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The most costly oil fields in either region would be the first to be abandoned
under a carbon policy. Thus, the upper end of the cost distribution is the most
relevant for calibrating the supply elasticities. Our baseline values of εS = 0.5
and ε∗S = 0.5 are close to the slope shown in the figures when we consider only
costs above the median. Our alternative value of ε∗S = 1 is closer to the slope if
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Data
we were to use the upper 75% of costs or even all the data.
Lacking this distributional data for coal and natural gas fields, we assume that
the distribution for oil extraction is representative of all fossil fuels.
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